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ABSTRACT 
Functional fixedness is a cognitive function whereby an individual becomes fixated 
on a given function of an object, which prevents the individual from using the object in an 
alternative fashion to solve a problem (Duncker, 1935/1945).  The current study analyzed the 
effect of functional fixedness on 36 children from three different age groups, preschool, 
second grade, and ninth grade.  The children were presented with a problem solving activity 
based on a problem used by German and Defeyter (2000), in which they concluded that 
young children are immune to the effects of functional fixedness.  Research conducted by 
Chrysikou (2006) indicated using an alternative categorization task could reduce the effects 
of fixation.  The current research sought to answer three research question: are children 
susceptible to the effects of functional fixedness; are there differences in the effect of 
functional fixedness based on age; and does participating in an alternative categorization task 
reduce the effect of functional fixedness.  The results indicated that children are susceptible 
to the effects of functional fixedness, when the children use the target object in a typical 
preutilization function, regardless of age.  The results also did not demonstrate a reduction in 
the effect of functional fixedness after participating in an alternative categorization task.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 Technology as defined by the International Technology Education Association 
(2000, p2) is “…[a] diverse collection of processes and knowledge that people use to 
extend human abilities and to satisfy human needs and wants.”  According to the 
American Heritage College Dictionary (1993), the word technology is derived from the 
Greek word tekhnologia meaning systematic treatment of an art or craft: teché meaning 
skill and ology defined as science, theory or study.  Throughout history, people have used 
their problem solving ability to develop new technology to meet their wants and needs.  
Despite the dependence on creating solutions to society’s problems, little formal research 
has been conducted on the development of the cognitive thought involved in 
technological problem solving or the most effective means of teaching children how to 
improve their problem solving ability. 
Problem Solving in Education 
Problem solving, the process of developing a plausible solution to an encountered 
obstruction, is an important cognitive ability used throughout a person’s life.  The 
importance of problem-solving is recognized by teachers of English, Mathematics, 
Science, Social Studies, and Technology, as evidenced by its inclusion in their 
professional association standards (International Reading Association and the National 
Council of Teachers of English, 1996; International Technology Education Association, 
2000; National Council for the Social Studies, 1994; National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics, 2000; National Research Council, 1996).  Despite the apparent importance 
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of the development of problem solving abilities, research on problem solving within the 
educational community is limited (Petrina, Feng, & Kim, 2007). 
 The lack of research on problem solving within technology education requires the 
study of research in other disciplines, particularly cognitive development.  One area of 
problem solving that has received some attention from the cognitive development 
community is the impact of functional fixation on an individual’s ability to generate 
solutions.  According to Duncker (1935/1945), functional fixedness is a condition where 
an individual’s problem solving ability is impaired due to a fixation on the common or 
intended function of an object.  Brown (1989) concluded some forms of learning during 
analogous problems can create situation of functional fixedness or negative transfer in 
children as young as two.  While other forms of learning within the same, analogous 
problems can create flexible thinking. In contrast, German and Defeyter (2000) 
conducted a study using a different methodology and concluded children younger than 
the age of six demonstrated immunity to functional fixedness.  Chrysikou (2006) in a 
study on insight problems concluded the use of an alternative categorization task could 
reduce the effect of functional fixedness. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study is to understand the differences in children’s thought 
processes as they develop solutions to technological problems.  The specific aspects of 
problem solving the study will focus on are: the existence of functional fixedness in 
technological problem-solving, understanding how functional fixedness affects children’s 
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development of solutions, and the differences of functional fixedness in children pre-
kindergarten to ninth grade. 
Statement of the Problem 
 In general, little is understood concerning the cognitive and developmental 
dimensions of technological problem solving and more specifically, there is a debate 
within the literature on the role of functional fixedness in problem solving. 
Research Questions 
1. Are children impacted by functional fixedness when solving technological 
problems? 
Hypothesis I: There is no difference in the use of the target object in 
participant’s solutions to the problem, based on the target object being 
presented to the participant in a fixated condition or a nonfixated condition. 
Hypothesis II: There is no difference in the amount of time participants spent 
solving the problem, based on whether or not the participants used the target 
object. 
Hypothesis III: There is no difference in the amount of time participants spent 
solving the problem based on whether they received the object in the fixated 
or nonfixated condition. 
2. Is there a difference in functional fixedness in children from pre-kindergarten to 
ninth grade? 
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Hypothesis IV: There is no difference in the problem solving performance 
between preschoolers, second graders, and ninth graders. 
3. Does completing an alternative categorization task, a form of divergent thinking 
task, improve problem-solving performance? 
Hypothesis V: There is no difference in problem solving performance between 
participants who were presented with the alternative categorization task prior 
to attempting to solve the problem. 
Contributions to Technology Education 
 The significance of the study is to improve pedagogy and curriculum 
development within the field of technology and engineering.  By having, a deeper 
understanding of the cognitive development of problem solving, educators will be able to 
improve instructional strategies for teaching students how to be better problem solvers.  
Secondly, by having a deeper understanding of the cognitive development of problem 
solving, educators will be able to improve the development of curriculum used to instruct 
students on problem solving.  Finally, by having a deeper understanding of the cognitive 
development of problem solving, educators will be better prepared to assist individuals to 
improve their problem solving strategies.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
Cognitive Development Theories 
 In order to begin to understand the cognitive development of problem solving, 
first one needs to have an understanding of the different theories of cognitive 
development.  Some of the most widely referenced theories of cognitive development, 
Piaget, Vygotsky, Information Processing Theory, as well as the Goswami’s theory, 
which is less known within the educational community. 
Jean Piaget, one of the most often cited developmental psychologists, applied his 
formal education in biology and natural sciences to his desire to understand the human 
psyche.  Much of Piaget’s work is focused on the structural changes of intelligence and 
not the functional aspects.  At the core of the Piagetian theory is the mechanism of 
equilibration.  Equilibration, in terms of Piaget, is most notably the balance between 
assimilation of the new to the old and accommodation, adapting the old to the new.  The 
mechanism of equilibration leads to the development of new knowledge by building on 
what the individual has already learned (Flavell, 1963; Smith, 2002). 
 Piaget is most notably known for his theory of developmental stages or periods: 
sensory-motor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational.  The first 
period, sensory-motor period, in which the infant’s cognition develops from simple 
sensory input from their reflexes to a toddler who is capable of making internal symbolic 
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representations based on sensory-motor input.  There are six stages within the sensory 
motor period.  In the first stage, the infant is a newborn and exhibits little more than 
primitive reflexes, such as sucking, swallowing, and crying.  In the second stage, the 
infant’s reflexes become more coordinated, such as a reflexive precursor to grasping.  In 
the third stage, infants begin to focus their actions toward objects around them.  In the 
fourth stage, infants’ actions are now recognizable as intentional.  In the fifth stage, 
infants begin to seek new experiences to explore.  In the final stage, infants are able to 
create internal representations of their experiences (Flavell, 1963). 
 Following the sensory-motor period is the period of preparation for and 
organization of concrete operations.  The first subperiod is preoperational thought, where 
a toddler begins to apply their newly developed ability of representation to increasingly 
more complex problems.  As children progress through the preoperational subperiod their 
thought process becomes less ridged and more flexible.  Finally, children in the 
preoperational subperiod progress from representational thought to simple intuition, and 
finally to articulated representations.  The second subperiod is concrete operations, where 
children begin developing organized cognitive structures called groupings (Flavell, 
1963). 
 The final period is the period of formal operations.  The period of formal 
operations is marked by children’s ability to think abstractly.  The restructure that occurs 
within the formal operations period allows the child, for the first time, to think about all 
of the possible consequences of their actions or decisions.  Children are able to use 
hypothetical deductive reasoning.  Finally, within the formal operations period the 
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groupings, cognitive organizational structures, are firmly developed and an 
interconnected lattice is developed (Flavell, 1963). 
 Although Piaget may have had more impact on developmental psychology than 
any other person, over the past thirty years many of his theories have been proven to 
contain flaws (Goswami, 2002b; Lourenco & Machado, 1996; Murphy, 2002; Spelke, 
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002).  The 
most cited part of Piaget’s theory, developmental stages, is also the most contested.  
Many of the studies conducted within the last thirty years have demonstrated the basic 
structures and functions of young children and infants are not unlike those of adults 
(Murphy, 2002).  However, this does not imply an absence of cognitive development.  
Rather what many modern psychologists will argue is the basic neurological structures 
and rudimentary functions are present at birth. However, the cognitive differences 
existing between children and adults are a result of differences in experiences, domain 
knowledge, and processing capacity. 
 A second prominent developmental psychologist is Vygotsky.  Vygotsky’s work 
is most noted for his inclusion of the social and cultural influence on cognitive 
development.  Much like Piaget, Vygotsky argued cognition was developmental and 
needed to be studied across the lifespan.  Vygotsky argued language among other cultural 
and social tools mediates the cognitive development process.  Vygotsky argued that it is 
not possible to study a child’s cognitive development by studying the child in isolation, 
but rather one needs to study the child’s cognitive development as an interaction between 
the cognitive tools they use within the cultural society in which the learning occurs.  
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Finally, Vygotsky is also widely known for his idea of zone of proximal development, in 
which a comparison is made between the level of learning which occurs by an isolated 
individual versus the level of learning that occurs with the guidance of an expert.  In 
other words, studying the potential increase in cognitive develop as a result of have a 
teacher or mentor (Rowe, & Wertsch, 2002). 
 More recently Information-Processing models have been developed to study and 
understand cognitive development.  Information-processing models are a collection of 
models that seek to understand cognitive development through the use of computer 
analogies.  A major premise behind information-processing models is the brain receives 
input from our senses, processes the impulses into representations, and uses the 
representations to produce an output.  Information-processing models have introduced a 
variety of new theories and approaches to studying cognitive development (Goswami, 
2002a; Halford, 2002; Morra, Gobbo, Marini, & Sheese, 2008; Siegler, 1997; Siegler, & 
Alibali, 2004; Sternberg, 2002).  Some examples of new areas of research in information-
processing models are processing speed, cognitive complexity, and structure mapping 
(Halford, 2002). 
 Each of the aforementioned theories of cognitive development offered 
frameworks for the study of cognitive development, each with their own tradeoffs.  
Goswami (2002a) offers a twenty-first century framework that combines the time tested 
positive aspects of each of these theories into a one new framework.  To construct this 
theoretical framework, Goswami suggests taking the idea of knowledge being rooted in 
action and experience from Piaget’s theory.  While at the same time discarding the ideas 
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of content-independent developmental stages for the connectionist’s idea that cognitive 
development is incremental and context-dependent. The new framework would replace 
Piaget’s idea of language and representation as secondary to cognitive development with 
Vygotsky’s emphasis on the importance of language and culture in cognitive 
development.  It would include Vygotsky’s idea of the importance of parents, teachers, 
and other caregivers in the development of knowledge.  Finally, the framework would 
include the information-processing models’ hypotheses of higher-order cognitive 
processing needed to organize individuals’ complex and varied experiences. 
 Goswami (2002a) argues this new framework is based on the empirical evidence 
that infants are either born with or acquire through simple perceptual experiences a set of 
core principles that manage the development of future knowledge.  The successful 
implementation of this new framework is dependent on accurately describing the child’s 
cognitive framework, understanding the circumstances that lead to changes in a child’s 
explanatory framework, and determining the role of social and emotional experiences.  
Problem Solving 
Using Goswami’s (2002a) framework for understanding cognitive development in 
order to interpret the cognitive research on problem solving one would begin by 
examining problem solving research conducted with infants and toddlers.  
 Research in problem solving covers a wide range of topics, including inductive 
reasoning, deductive reasoning, causal reasoning, moral reasoning, and analytical 
reasoning, among others.  Traditionally, problem solving was studied by determining if 
children could discover and apply logical rules to isolated context-independent novel 
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situations.  Problem solving was considered a separate entity from concept formation.  
However, more recently researchers have determined problem solving and concept 
formation are interrelated and often depend on categorization, memory, context, prior 
experience, and transfer (Goswami, 2002b). 
Infants’ Problem-Solving 
 In recent years, there have been a number of researchers studying infants’ 
problem solving abilities.  Infants as young as 18-weeks-old have demonstrated an ability 
to use problem solving strategies when reaching for a moving object.  In von Hofsten’s 
(1980) study, infants, 18-weeks-old to 36-weeks-old, were presented with a moving 
object at three different rates of travel, 3.4cm/sec, 15cm/sec, and 30cm/sec.  At the 
slowest speed, 3.4cm/sec, the infants would reach for the moving object with their 
ipsilateral arm, meaning the arm located on the same side of their body as the object at its 
starting point, resulting in a chasing motion, at about the same frequency as their 
contralateral arm, the arm opposite the object at its starting position, which results in a 
path of interception.  However, when the object was moving faster at 15cm/sec and 
especially at 30cm/sec, the infants almost always chose to use their contralateral arm, 
resulting in a path of interception rather than attempting to chase the object.  The results 
of the study indicated that infants as young as 18-weeks-old are able to predict their 
ability to catch a moving object based on its rate of travel and to choose the strategy that 
is more likely to result in the successful accomplishment of that goal.  
 In a later study of infants 5-months-old to 13-months-old, von Hofsten and 
Ronnqvist (1988) observed that infants, like adults, begin to close their hand to grasp a 
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moving object 75% of the time before coming in contact with the object, which requires 
the infant to take into consideration the objects distance and velocity in relationship to the 
infants own hand.  Again indicating an ability to adjust their strategy to accomplish their 
goal.  In order to further understand infants’ ability to predict the trajectory of a moving 
object, von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Feng, and Rosander (1998) modified a drafting 
plotter to create an experiment that would allow an object to change its linear motion in 
an non-predictive pattern.  The results of the study indicated that infants continued to 
follow the objects initial linear path for at least 200 ms after the object hand changed 
direction, which indicates that the infants’ were anticipating the trajectory of the object’s 
motion in order to move their hand to intercept the object.  The results also indicate that 
infants as young as 2-months-old are able to apply their visual perception of distance and 
velocity in order to devise a plan of action to achieve a given goal, also referred to as 
problem solving. 
 In a related study, Chen, Keen, Rosander, and von Hofsten (2010) observed when 
toddlers, 18- to 36-months-old, built towers out of wooden blocks, they demonstrated 
similar kinetic motions and techniques as adults who performed similar tasks; 
specifically, planning their movements as a complete set of movements not as individual 
sequential movements (Rosenbaum, Halloran, & Cohen, 2006).  First, the toddlers’ 
movements indicated a planning of the complete sequence of movements to achieve the 
goal of stacking the blocks upon the initial movement of their hand, instead of planning 
each individual movement, such as adjusting their movement after picking up the block.  
Second, the toddlers who were more skilled at constructing the tower would reach their 
peak speed early in the movement in order to allow for a greater deceleration as they 
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approached the tower resulting in greater control of placing the block.  This use of early 
acceleration and greater deceleration when precision was needed is consistent with the 
way adults complete similar tasks, which indicates an anticipation for the need for slower 
hand movements in precision operations (Chen, Keen, Rosander, & von Hofsten, 2010). 
 Similarly, Claxton, Keen, and McCarty (2003) observed 10-month-old infants 
adjusted the speed in which they would reach for an object based on their intended use of 
the object.  Similar to adults, the infants would reach for a ball at a slower rate of speed, 
when they were going to complete a task, which require precision (placing the ball in a 
narrow tube).  However, the infants would reach for the same ball at a much faster pace if 
they were going to throw the ball into a large tube located on the floor (a task which does 
not require precision). 
A second area of research into infants’ problem solving is the area of hand 
grasping orientation in relationship to the alignment of tools or objects.  In a series of 
studies in which infants were presented with a rod orientated in a horizontal or vertical 
position, 7-month-old and 9-month-old infants consistently preoriented the alignment of 
their hands in relationship to the alignment of the rod.  In order to determine if the infants 
preorientation was determined by visual cues rather than a mental representation of the 
object, the experimenters conducted the reaching task both in a well lit room and in 
darkness (McCarty, Clifton, Ashmead, Lee, & Goubet, 2001).  
 In the first experiment, the infants were presented with the rod in visual light and 
with a glow-in-the-dark rod with the lights turned off.  The result of the experiment 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the infants’ hand orientation based on 
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the lighting condition.  The experiment also indicated that although 5-month-olds did 
grasp the rod with the appropriate hand orientation, they did not consistently preorientate 
their grasp before coming in contact with the rod.  However, both the 7-month-old and 9-
month-old infants consistently preorientated their hand to the appropriate grip before 
coming into contact with the rod.  The results of the first experiment indicated that the 
infants’ visual observation of their hand did not influence the infants’ preorientation 
(McCarty, et al., 2001). 
 In the second experiment the rod was again display to the infants in a lighted 
condition, where the rod was illuminated by a light installed inside the rod and in a 
darkened condition where the rod would be illuminated at the beginning of the trail but as 
the infants hand reached 10cm from the rod, the infant would trigger an infrared beam 
that would turn off the rod, leaving the infant in the dark.  The result of the second 
experiment indicated that the 7-month-old and 9-month-old infants again preorientated 
their grip according to the alignment of the rod when they last saw it, indicating they had 
constructed a mental orientation of the rod even though they could no longer see it.  The 
results of the experiment also indicate that 7-month-old infants have already developed 
proprioception, the ability to sense the location and orientation of ones own limb without 
being able to see it by using the tactile sensation of movement (McCarty, et al., 2001). 
 In the third experiment, only 9-month-old infants were used and both conditions 
were presented in a darkened room.  In one condition, the rod was illuminated and 
brought within the reaching space of the infant.  In the second condition, the rod was 
illuminated briefly in order to show the infant the rods orientation before it was turned off 
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and moved into the infants reaching space.  In both conditions, the infants preorientated 
the appropriate grip based on the orientation of the rod.  The results of the third 
experiment indicates that 9-month-old infants are able to construct a mental image of an 
object and store that image in the memory in order to complete a task (McCarty, et al., 
2001). 
 Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, and Perris (1991) conducted a study with 6-month-olds 
to determine if infants are able to create mental representations of objects, based on 
differences in grasping motion whether the object they were reaching for was large or 
small.  In a fully lit room, the infants did consistently vary the alignment of their arms 
based on whether the object they were looking at was large or small.  To determine if the 
infants could create a mental image of the objects, a different sound was associated with 
the two objects, which provided an auditory clue as to whether the object was large or 
small.  Then the lights in the room were turned off and the infant was presented with the 
two objects along with their corresponding auditory clues.  Using infrared cameras, the 
infants were observed using the same differentiated arm motions based on whether the 
object was large or small.  Therefore, the researchers concluded that the infants had to 
have created a mental image of the object in order to determine the appropriate grasp 
before touching the object. 
Berger and Adolph (2003) studied means-end problem solving in16-month-old 
infants.  The infants were directed to walk across wide and narrow bridges with and 
without a handrail to determine what strategies they would implement to successfully 
cross over the bridge.  Based on the results of their study, Berger and Adolph determined 
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infants develop a variety of strategies to adjust to the conditions of the task at hand.  They 
also argue infants are able to apply higher order cognitive skills to determine the 
appropriate selection and adjustment of problem solving strategies. 
 Berger, Adolph, and Lobo (2005) continued their research on infants’ means-end 
problem solving to determine if the material the handrail was constructed out of would 
impact 16-month-olds’ strategies.  Sixteen-month-old infants were again directed to walk 
across three bridges varying in width, while using a handrail.  However, in this study the 
infants were presented with a handrail made of wood and another made of foam.  The 
first goal of the study was to determine if infants were able to consider the material 
properties of the handrail.  The second goal of the study was to observe the process 
infants demonstrated in determining the need for a tool, searching for a tool, and using 
the tool.  The third goal of the study was to determine if walking experience influenced 
the use of the handrail. 
 Infants in the handrail study demonstrated their ability to determine differences in 
materials properties through exploration.  Instead of abandoning the softer handrail, as 
the researches predicted, the infants demonstrated novel strategies to achieve a solution to 
their means-end problem.  Berger, Adolph, and Lobo (2005) argue infants are able to 
determine when it is necessary to employ the use of a tool.  Once an infant has 
determined the need for a tool, they will begin exploring their surroundings for a viable 
solution.  Finally, within their exploration infants will evaluate the structural and material 
properties of potential tools. 
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 McCarty, Clifton, and Collard (1999) conducted a study with infants and toddlers, 
9-months-old, 14-months-old, and 19-months-old to examine their goal directed problem 
solving strategies. In order to study if the children’s grasp selection was determined by a 
specific goal, the children were presented with a spoon that contained food or a spoon 
with a toy attached to it.  As a result, the children consistently inserted the spoon 
containing the food in their mouth.  However, the children did not consistently insert the 
spoon with the toy in their mouth, indicating that the children’s movements related to the 
spoon with the food was based on the specific goal of feeding.  
The children were presented with the spoon aligned so that the handle was near 
one hand and the bowl end was near the other hand.  The orientation of the spoon was 
alternated so the handle end would be near their preferred hand on alternating trials.  This 
variation presented the problem to the children to either alter their grip, alter the path of 
the spoon to their mouth, or to grasp the food end of the spoon.  The results of the study 
indicated that the 9-month-old infants did not always plan their actions relative to the 
alignment of their grip and the path to their mouth, resulting in inserting the handle end 
of the spoon first before readjusting the spoon to get the food in their mouth.  The others 
referred to this strategy as the feedback-based strategy, meaning that the infants would 
only adjust their strategy when they received feedback that their plan was not working. 
Fourteen-month-olds on the other hand, were more likely to demonstrate a partial 
planned strategy, in which they would alter their path to their mouth when they 
determined their grip would result in a misalignment of the food-end of the spoon with 
their mouth.  When the 14-mouth-olds griped the spoon with the wrong hand, they 
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always made corrections before reaching their mouth, preventing them from inserting the 
handle end of the spoon.  The third strategy demonstrated by the children was the fully 
planned strategy, where the selection of the grip and the path to the child’s mouth was 
planned before reaching for the spoon.  Finally, the researchers observed that the 19-
month-olds were more likely then the younger children to suppress their initial tendency 
to use their preferred hand, resulting in a strategy of altering their hand selection based on 
the alignment of the spoon. 
McCarty, Clifton, and Collard (2001) conducted a study of infants’ problem 
solving strategies with infants, 9-, 14-, 19-, and 24-months-old.  The infants were 
presented with four different tools, a spoon, a hairbrush, a toy hammer, and a magnet.  
After being orientated to the use and purpose of the tools, the infants were asked to 
complete six tasks: spoon-to-self, spoon-to-other, brush-to-self, brush-to-other, hammer-
to-object, and magnet-to-object.  McCarty, Clifton, and Collard observed, the 9-month-
olds generally used oral exploration of the tools instead of their demonstrated function.  
The one exception was the use of the spoon; the 9-month-olds appropriately used the 
spoon 76 out of 107 trials.  The older infants appropriately used each of the tools the 
majority of the time.  The researchers concluded appropriate tool use probably occurs 
between 9 and 14 months.  Additionally, as infants become more familiar with a tool 
their actions indicate an anticipation of selecting the appropriate solution. 
 In a similar study, Claxton, McCarty, and Keen (2009) observed 19-month-old 
toddlers were more likely to apply the more efficient radial hand grip to tools when the 
task affected themselves (feeding oneself) than when the task was affected another object 
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(pouring water into a waterwheel to cause it to rotate).  The results indicate that human’s 
problem solving ability first develops in the context of how a solution will benefit the 
individual to later ability to develop solutions that will benefit others. 
In addition to studying infants’ problem solving as it relates to tool use.  
Researchers have examined the problem solving strategies preschoolers use in order to 
accomplish mathematical problems. The results of Cohen’s (1996) research supports 
previous research that preschoolers use a repertoire of strategies to solve mathematical 
problems and therefore do not solely rely on one strategy.  The results also indicated that 
despite not being encouraged to do so, the preschoolers continued to adjust their problem 
solving strategies in an attempt to increase their problem solving efficiency, as measured 
by the number of moves and solution strategy.  The children demonstrated a progression 
towards a more sophisticated organizational strategy of the problem-solving task, 
resulting in the increase in efficiency.  As the preschoolers became more familiar with the 
problem-solving task, they moved from undefined to defined strategies. 
 In recent years, habituation experiments have indicated that young infants possess 
the ability to understand core concepts of physics, such as solidity and continuity of 
objects (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992).  However, there is also 
recent research that indicates that toddlers no longer possess the same ability to 
understand physical concepts.  Although the data from these studies may indicate that 
toddlers somehow loose their understanding of basic concepts of physics, Keen (2003) 
explains that the differences are more likely a result of differences in methodology.  In 
the infant research, experimenters use habituation to determine if infants recognize 
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inconsistencies in the laws of physics, based on the theory that infants will look at a 
situation longer if it is unfamiliar to them.   In contrast, research involving toddlers, 
requires the participants to actively search for an object. 
 Baillargeon (1994) provides an additional explanation as to how the changes in 
infants physiological development, not necessarily cognitive develop and changes in 
research methodology could be the contributing factor in discrepancies in research results 
between infants and toddlers.  Many studies report infants develop a greater 
understanding of concepts of physics around six months of age.  As Baillargeon points 
out, around six months of age, infants begin to sit upright providing them with a better 
vantage point in which to observe and interact with their surroundings.  Therefore, six-
month-old infants’ physiological development, sitting upright, leads to a greater 
understanding of their surroundings, not necessarily a simple increase in cognitive 
function or neurological development.  
Preschoolers’ Problem-Solving 
 According to Want and Harris (2001), little research has been conducted on 
young children’s ability to use tools to accomplish a problem-solving task.  Much of the 
early literature with in the field of psychology has focused on non-human primates’ 
ability to use tools in problem solving.  Want and Harris’ conducted two studies with 2- 
and 3-year-old children to understand the relationship between young children’s 
understanding of adults’ demonstrated tool use and the children’s understanding of the 
causal relationships of tool use and the successful solution to a problem-solving task.  In 
the study, children were presented with two different problem-solving apparatus, which 
 20 
contained a toy that needed to be retrieved.  In the first study, the children were presented 
with an elongated H-shaped tubular structure, with one leg of the H containing a vertical 
tube, which would trap the toy if it were to fall in it.  The problem required the children 
to insert an L-shaped stick into the horizontal tube and push the toy away from the “trap” 
to the other end of the horizontal tube, in order to retrieve it.  If the toy was pushed from 
the wrong side, it would fall down into the vertical tube, becoming trapped. 
 The children were assigned to one of four groups, two experimental groups and 
two control groups.  In one experimental group, the children were given a demonstration 
on how to correctly use the tool to retrieve the toy from the horizontal tube.  In the 
second group, the children were first given a demonstration on how to incorrectly use the 
tool to retrieve the toy, resulting in the toy falling into the vertical “trap” and the 
experimenter exclaiming oops.  The experimenter would replace the toy and demonstrate 
how to correctly use the tool to push the toy away from the vertical trap and out the other 
side.  In the two control groups, the experimenter demonstrated the same tool use motion, 
however, the tool was never inserted into the tube, but rather was moved along the top of 
the horizontal tube.  The children had 90 seconds to complete the task and the apparatus 
was rotated 180º (switching the side of the trap) after each attempt (Want & Harris, 
2001). 
 Only 2 out of the 20 children who were in the control group successfully used the 
tool to retrieve the toy from the tube.  In other words, the children were unable to learn 
how to retrieve the toy from the apparatus by simply watching an adult perform the 
motions of the tool path in seemingly abstractness, without the tool actually traveling 
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inside the tube and contacting the toy.  Conversely, all of the children in the experimental 
groups used the stick to either push the toy into the trap or successfully retrieve the toy.  
Although the 2-year-olds in the experimental groups use the tool to move the toy, there 
was no significant difference in successful retrieval of the toy based on which 
experimental condition they received.  However, the 3-year-olds did demonstrate a 
significant increase in successful retrieval rates within the experimental group, which 
received the demonstration of the incorrect direction to push the toy, leading to it falling 
into the vertical trap, and the demonstration of the correct direction to push the toy 
resulting in the retrieval of the toy.  This difference could indicate that the 3-year-olds in 
the incorrect plus correct demonstration had a greater understanding of the causal 
relationship between the direction of travel and the successful retrieval of the toy (Want 
& Harris, 2001). 
 Want and Harris’ (2001) second study used a vertical Y-shaped channel made out 
of wood and covered with acrylic, to allow for clear visibility.  Near the bottom of the Y 
was a toy that was secured to the side of the channel by a magnet, which could be 
knocked free by dropping a marble into one of the two openings at the top of the Y.  One 
side of the Y allowed the marble to freely travel down the Y to the location of the toy and 
then out the bottom.  The other side of the Y had a wooden block, which prevented the 
marble from passing through. 
 In this second study, the 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds were divided into five 
demonstration groups.  The first group watched a demonstration where the marble was 
placed in the correct side of the Y, resulting in the toy being retrieved from the bottom of 
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the apparatus.  In the second group, the children watched a demonstration of the 
experimenter placing the marble first in the incorrect side of the Y, resulting in the 
marble becoming visibly blocked and the experimenter exclaiming oops.  Then they 
watched as the experimenter placed a second marble into the correct side of the Y, 
resulting in the toy being retrieved.  In the third group, the children watched as the 
experimenter lowered the marble partway into the incorrect side of the Y and exclaimed 
oops, before with drawing the marble and dropping it into the correct side of the Y, 
resulting in the toy being retrieved.  In the forth group, the children watched the 
experimenter drop the marble into the incorrect side of the Y, where it was visibly stuck, 
resulting in the experimenter exclaiming oops.  The fifth group was considered the 
control group, where the children watched the experimenter trace the correct marble path 
on the outside of the acrylic (Want & Harris, 2001). 
 Consistent with the first study, 17 of the 20 children in the control group did not 
insert the marble into either side of the apparatus, indicating that seeing the tool path did 
not provide enough information for the children to successfully attempt to solve the 
problem.  Overall, the children across age groups were more successful at using the tool 
to solve the problem then the children in the control group.  However, there was no 
significant difference among the 2-year-olds when compared across the four experimental 
conditions.  Therefore, the researchers argue that the 2-year-olds were able to learn the 
causal relationship between the tool use and the successful retrieval of the toy on a global 
scale, meaning they understood the marble could be used to dislodge the toy.  However, 
the 2-year-olds did not understand the detailed causal relationship between the path the 
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marble traveled, the block included in one of the paths, and the retrieval of the toy (Want 
& Harris, 2001). 
 The 3-year-olds on the other hand, demonstrated a significant improvement in 
performance when they watched either the full or the partial insertion of the marble into 
the incorrect side of the Y and saw the marble travel through the correct side of the Y, 
resulting in the toy being dislodged.  The results indicate that 3-year-olds are able to 
better understand the specific causal relationship between the tool use and its relationship 
to a specific problem, through the observation of others’ mistakes (Want & Harris, 2001).  
As the researchers indicated in their discussion, it is unclear if the study’s results indicate 
a developmental change in tool use problem solving ability between 2 and 3 years of age 
or if the specific problems presented in this study were more familiar to 3-year-olds.  
However, what does appear to be clear is that young children do not simply mimic 
others’ use of tools, but rather are capable of understanding the causal relationship 
between a tool’s function and its use in problem solving. 
 Fleer (2000) conducted a study with 16 children ranging in age from three years 
old to five years old, in which the children were presented with a story about a fictional 
character, who needs a companion.  The children were instructed to create a drawing of 
their companion character from which they could construct a three-dimensional model 
using the given materials.  Over a two-week process, the children’s planning, decision-
making, and construction were observed.  The children all choose to use familiar animals 
as the companion character, despite not being instructed to do so.   
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The children were observed using familiar construction techniques and 
demonstrated a concurrent assessment process resulting in alterations to their design 
concurrently with the construction of that design.  Many of the alteration to the child’s 
original design were a result of difficulties with the materials or construction technique, 
the influence of observing their peer’s character construction, and their limited ability to 
represent a three-dimensional object through two-dimensional drawings.  The majority of 
children chose to only use a front view of their character, thereby leaving out important 
three-dimensional information needed for the construction of the character (Fleer, 2000). 
Fleer (2000) concluded children, as young as three years old, are able to develop a 
plan of action, in general terms, to construct a solution to a problem.  However, they also 
demonstrated a limitation in their ability to develop detailed plans from which they could 
use for the construction of there idea.  In other words, there is a knowledge gap between 
their idea for a solution and the technical knowledge necessary to translate that idea into a 
physical model.  Therefore, Fleer suggests teachers need to instruct children how to 
represent their ideas on paper in the form of multiview or isometric drawings, increase 
the children’s understanding of joining materials, and increase the children’s experiences 
with observing adults progressing from an idea, to a two-dimensional representation, to a 
three-dimensional model of the idea.  
Differences in Problem Solving Performance 
 In studying the differences in problem solving performance, Flesher (1993) 
determined that the familiarity of the problem’s context influenced the participants’ 
performance.  In other words, individuals were more successful at solving the problem 
 25 
when they were problem solving within their contextual area.  For instance, maintenance 
technicians would search for the fault in the system that was previously working, while 
the design engineer considered theoretical constructions and basic conceptual operations 
of faulty systems. 
 Participants in Flesher’s (1993) study were able to successfully solve the 
problems within their self-identified area of expertise.  Only the design engineers 
correctly framed the problem and considered a design flaw.  
Expert versus Novice 
 A popular form of research in engineering and problem solving research is to 
compare the performance of experts with the performance of novices.  Experts tend to 
have a large bank of problem solving strategies, tend to sort problems by their solution 
procedure (Christiaans & Venselaar, 2005) and possess a greater volume of domain 
specific knowledge (Johnson, & Satchwell, 1993).  Novices tend to spend a large amount 
of time trying to define the problem, whereas experts tend to take a preliminary 
assessment of the problem definition and then quickly move to early solution 
suppositions, which are used as a means to further define and solve the problem in a 
codependent process.  Novices tend to focus on a depth-first approach, whereas experts 
tend to use a breadth-first approach, which allows for the consideration of a greater 
number of possible solutions (Cross, 2004).   
Experts and novices tend to demonstrate clear differences in their solution 
strategies, with novice problem solvers using more of a trial-and-error or exhaustive 
search strategy and experts demonstrating a more structured, systematic, and methodical 
 26 
approach to solution development.  Experts demonstrate faster cognitive speeds, an 
ability to use and store larger chunks of problem relevant information, and recognize the 
underlying principles within the problem.  They tend to focus on solution development 
rather than problem analysis, by determining the appropriate scope of the problem and 
then executing a systematic approach to information gathering based on prioritized set of 
criteria (Cross, 2004).   
Additionally, both experts and novices use analogies in order to construct a 
cognitive map of their understanding of the available information as compared to their 
prior knowledge in order to make predictions about the plausibility of their solutions 
(Collins, & Gentner, 1987).  Experts tend to use more schema-driven analogies, were as, 
novices tend to use more case-driven analogies, indicating that experts are less dependent 
on applying a solution from a specific prior experience, but rather are able to recognize 
familiar categories of problems and solutions, in order to determine the most appropriate 
problem-solving strategy (Ball, Ormerod, Morley, 2004).    In other words, experts are 
able to use their greater domain specific knowledge to recognize the problem from a 
more abstract and holistic perspective, allowing them to see the relationship of 
information involved in the problem.  Where as, novices, who possess less domain 
knowledge and tend to use surface level cues, are unable to see the complete picture and 
therefore are unable to recognize the nuances and complexities that would prevent the 
direct application of a prior solution to the existing problem. 
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Developing Expertise 
Experts do not usually develop their expertise on their own, but rather, they 
typically have a coach, mentor, or teacher that helps them develop their skills through 
deliberate practice and focused concentration over a minimum of ten years (Ericsson, 
2002). 
Cary and Carlson (2001) conducted three experiments with college students to 
test the use and benefits of external memory aids during problem solving.  They observed 
that over time participants took fewer notes indicating they were becoming more efficient 
at using their internal working memory and less dependent on the external memory aid.  
Cary and Carlson concluded external memory aids are used in coordination with the 
participant’s internal working memory, providing secondary storage and categorization 
for information that could not be retained internally.  They also concluded the 
coordination of internal and external memory is conducted on a cost-benefit assessment.  
In an effort to have novice designers replicate the thought process of experts, 
Yilmaz, Seirfert, and Gonzalez (2010) conducted a study to determine if the heuristics 
used by an expert industrial designer could be taught to novice designers, psychology 
students, in an effort to improve their performance in redesigning a set of salt and pepper 
shakers.  The participants who were assigned to one of three experimental groups were 
taught six heuristics, “merging, rescaling, substituting, changing configuration, repeating, 
and nesting” (p340).  The participants in the experimental groups were more likely to 
develop salt and pepper shakers that were more creative and that had more variation, than 
participants in the control group, who did not received any instructions on design 
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heuristics.  However, although the participants in the heuristics groups developed more 
creative designs, the designs that were generated by the control group were rated to be 
significantly more practical. 
Insight and Functional Fixedness 
 “Einstellung is the set which immediately predisposes an organism to one type of 
motor or conscious act” (Warren, 1934 as cited in Luchins, 1942, p3).  Accordig to 
Bilalic, McLeod, and Gobet (2010), the Einstellung effect is a function of cognitive 
efficiency.  When an individual is able to recognize similarities in a given problem, it 
allows the person to solve the problem relatively efficiently by applying a previous 
solution to the problem.  However, when an individual mistakenly identifies similarities 
in a given problem, where the use of a previous solution will not solve the problem, a 
cognitive conflict can be created, in which the individual is convinced the previous 
solution should work to solve the problem, leaving the individual unable to determine 
why the solution will not function. 
One theory into the inability to achieve a solution to an insight problem is the idea 
of functional fixedness widely accredited to Karl Duncker, a Gestalt psychologist, who in 
1935 wrote a book entitled Zur Psychologie des produktiven Denkens (Duncker, 
1935/1945; Goswami, 2002b).  Dunker describes functional fixedness as a condition in 
which an individual becomes fixated on the common or intended function of an object 
and is unable to envision an alternative use for the object (Dunker, 1935/1945).  
According to the researchers who support the idea of functional fixedness (e.g. German 
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& Defeyter, 2000; Jannson & Smith, 1991), this impairment can result in individuals 
being unable to solve seemingly simple problems. 
 To study the idea of functional fixedness Duncker (1935/1945) developed five 
experiments the “gimlet problem,” the “box problem,” the “pliers problem,” the “weight 
problem,” and the “paperclip problem.”  The gimlet problem required participants to 
hang three cords from a wooden ledge using two screw-hooks and a gimlet, the fixated 
item.  In addition to the three objects to be used in the solution, the participants were 
provided with a number of distracter items (e.g. paperclip, pencils, string, etc).  The 
participants in the control and experimental groups were provided with the same 
materials and instruction on how to complete the task.  Additionally, the wood ledge for 
the control group already contained the holes for the screws. 
 The box problem required participants to support three candles side by side on a 
door using tacks and three pasteboard boxes, the fixated objects.  Once again, the 
participants received the same instructions and materials to complete the task.  In the 
control group, the three boxes were randomly placed on the table among the distracter 
items, but were left empty.  In the experimental group, the three boxes were filled with 
some of the distracter items, fixating their function as a container (Duncker, 1935/1945). 
 The pliers problem, required participants to create a flower stand using a board as 
the platform, a wooden bar on one end of the board for support, and a pair pliers as the 
support on the other end of the board.  In both the control and experimental groups, the 
wooden bar was attached to the platform board.  However, in the control group the 
wooden bar was tied to the platform board and in the experimental group, the wooden bar 
 30 
was nailed to the platform board requiring the use of the pliers to free it.  The use of the 
pliers by the participants in the experimental group was intended to fixate the pliers’ 
function in its traditional tool use (Duncker, 1935/1945). 
 The weight problem required the participants to create a pendulum and secure it 
to the wall using a nail and a weight (fixated item).  In the control group a joint is 
attached to the string to provide a pendulum-weight and the weight (the critical item) is 
lying on the table among the distracters.  In the experimental group, the weight (critical 
item) is attached to the string fixating its function as a pendulum-weight (Duncker, 
1935/1945). 
 The paperclip problem required the participants to assemble four black squares 
onto a piece of white cardboard and suspend the cardboard from an eyelet screwed to the 
ceiling using a paperclip (fixated item).  The control group was provided glue to fasten 
the four black squares to the white cardboard.  The experimental group was provided 
additional paperclips to fasten the four black squares to the white cardboard.  The use of 
the paperclips as a fastener in the experimental group was intended to fixate the function 
of a paperclip as a simple fastener used with paper products (Duncker, 1935/1945). 
 For each of the experiments described above, the participants’ performance was 
measured on their successful completion of the predetermined solution and on their 
alternative attempted solutions.  In all five experiments, the control group outperformed 
the functional fixated group with 97.1% of the problems solved in the control group 
versus 58.2% of the problems solved in the functional fixed group.  Secondly, the 
alternative attempted solutions measurement indicated on average participants in the 
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experimental group, who successfully solved the problems, were more likely to explore 
the use of distracter objects before determining the correct solution (Duncker, 
1935/1945). 
In Duncker’s (1935/1945) original study, participants pre-utilized an object 
according to its typical function and then the participants were expected to use the object 
in an atypical function in order to solve the experimental problem.  Birch and Rabinowitz 
(1951), modified Maier’s (1930; 1931) two-string problem to evaluate if participants 
were given a choice of two objects to use as a weight, is their a bias toward one object’s 
plausible use as a pendulum over the other.  In Birch and Rabinowitz (1951), participants 
were divided into one control group and two experimental groups, where the participants 
pre-utilized one of two objects in a typical function.  All three groups of participants were 
then presented with the Maier (1930; 1931) two-string problem, in which the participants 
had to use one of the two objects that the experimental groups pre-utilized.  The results 
indicated that the control group did not demonstrate a preference for either object and 
within each experimental group, the participants were more likely to select the object that 
they did not pre-utilize.  Therefore, the results of the experiment support Duncker’s 
claims that pre-utilization can lead to functional fixation (Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951). 
 The success of the Duncker (1935/1945) experiments has led to a continuous and 
varied debate within the field of cognitive psychology over the existence of functional 
fixedness and its role in creativity and problem solving.  Replications of Duncker’s 
experiments, by researchers such as Adamson (1952), have continued to produce similar 
results; pre-utilization results in functional fixedness.  However, researchers such as 
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Weisberg and Alba (1981) question the conclusions and methodological approaches used 
by many researchers studying functional fixedness and insight problem solving.  
According to Weisberg and Alba (1981), fixation and insight are descriptive terms used 
to describe the researchers’ observations of their participants’ inability to solve certain 
types of problems and not empirically supported explanations of neurological function.   
Additionally, Weisberg and Alba (1981) describe the conclusion of fixedness as a 
circular argument.  According to the argument of fixation, the only way to measure if a 
person has become fixated is if they are unable to solve the assigned problem.  While at 
the same time, the reason the person was unable to solve the problem was that they were 
fixated.  This type of argument creates an unprovable set of interdependent conditions.  
Weisberg and Alba (1981) on the other hand theorize the difficulty observed in the 
insight and fixated problems is a result of the process people progress through when 
encountering any type of problem; mainly the application of prior experiences. 
When individuals approach a problem, they call on their prior experiences and 
knowledge within a specific domain they perceive relevant to the given problem 
(Weisberg & Alba, 1981).  For example, in Duncker’s (1935/1945) weight problem a 
person calls on their prior experiences with securing objects to a wall, such as using a 
hammer.  As the person begins to apply their prior knowledge, they are continuously 
monitoring how well their prior knowledge is working in the current situation.  If the 
individual determines the application of their prior knowledge is not quite working they 
begin to adjust their solution to adapt to the new situation.  If the individual determines 
their chosen solution will not work for the new problem, the individual will begin 
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searching for alternative solutions within their predetermined domain of knowledge.  If 
the individual has exhausted all of their prior knowledge within the domain, they will 
then switch to a different domain of prior knowledge to determine a solution (Weisberg 
& Alba, 1981). 
Weisberg and Alba (1981) conducted seven experiments to test their theories on 
why insight and fixated problems prove to be difficult for participants.  In their first 
experiment, participants were presented with Maier’s (1930) nine-dot problem, which 
Gestalt theorists argue is difficult to solve because participants incorrectly assume they 
have to stay within the boundary of the square.  To test if participants would be freed of 
their fixation on staying within the square, participants in the three experimental groups 
were informed (after attempting 10 solutions) they had to go outside the boundary of the 
square in order to solve the problem.  In addition, one of the experimental groups (1 line) 
was provided with the first diagonal line of the solution.  A second experimental group 
(1+2 line) was provided with the first two lines of the solution.   
According to the insight theory, once the participants have been freed from their 
fixated thought they should immediately realize the solution.  As reported in other studies 
using the nine-dot problem, participants in the control group were unable to solve the 
problem.  However, contrary to insight theory participants who received the hint they 
needed to go outside the boundaries of the square did not demonstrate a significant 
improvement on their problem solving performance.  Only three of the participants were 
able to solve the problem and they took an average of five additional attempts to reach 
the solution.  Finally, the only group to have 100% of their participants solve the nine-dot 
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problem was the experimental group who received 2 of the 4 solution lines (Weisberg & 
Alba, 1981). 
Based on the results of their nine-dot experiments, Weisberg and Alba (1981) 
concluded the reported fixedness in the nine-dot experiment conducted by other 
researchers is not a result of fixation.  Rather the observed fixation is a result of 
participants lacking the necessary prior knowledge to conceive of a solution to the nine-
dot problem and the requirement to continue to attempt to solve the problem.   
Additionally, Weisberg and Alba (1981) concluded the way insight problems are 
designed, they intentionally instruct participants to search for a solution in an incorrect 
knowledge domain.  However, based on the limited information participants are 
provided, it is not clear to the participants they are using an incorrect knowledge domain.  
Finally, when participants are informed they are searching the wrong domain, 
participants often lack the necessary knowledge to determine the correct domain.  The 
combination of these factors leads to the perception of fixation. 
In the additional six experiments, Weisberg and Alba (1981) attempted to 
determine what is necessary to create a condition of truly insightful solution 
development.  Based on the results from these six experiments Weisberg and Alba 
concluded, people approach new problems by drawing on their prior knowledge related 
to the information they are provided.  In the process of attempting to solve the problem, 
individuals continually evaluate the appropriateness of their application of the selected 
prior knowledge and make the necessary adjustments needed for a valid solution.  
Weisberg and Alba did not observe any evidence of a phenomenon similar to insight.  
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Finally, Weisberg and Alba concluded experiences specific to a given problem are 
needed to solve similar problems in the future. 
Another approach to studying insight problems was conducted by Metcalfe and 
Wiebe (1987), to determine if there is a difference in the role of metacognition in 
problems, which are typically referred to as insight problems and those that are not.  In 
the first experiment, participants were presented with five insight problems and five 
noninsight problems.  As the participants worked on developing a solution to each of the 
problems, they recorded (every 15 seconds) how close they perceived they were to 
achieving the solution.  In the second experiment, participants were provided with five 
insight and five noninsight problems written on index cards.  The participants were told 
to rank the problems according to how easy they perceived each problem’s solution.  
Next, the participants indicated their perceived ability to solve each of the problems.  
Finally, while the participants worked on solving each of the problems, they were asked 
to indicate how close they perceived they were to solving the problem. 
Participants in the two experiments indicated a perception of incremental progress 
toward the solution in the noninsight problems but not in the insight problems.  
According to Metcalfe and Weibe (1987), these findings support the idea that solutions to 
insight problems arrive all of a sudden, were as noninsight problems occur as a result of a 
progression of thought.  Finally, the results from the second experiment indicate 
participants are less accurate at predicting their ability to solve insight problems then 
algebra (noninsight) problems. 
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 Weisberg (1992) directly questions the validity of the claims made by Metcalfe 
and Weibe (1987) based on empirical and logical errors.  First, Weisberg makes the 
argument that the problems Metcalfe and Weibe selected for their study were initially 
created specifically for their unfamiliarity to most people, whereas most people are 
familiar with their ability to solve algebraic problems.  Next, Weisberg questioned the 
accuracy and validity of Metcalfe and Weibe’s statistics and graphic representation of 
participants’ warmth rating.  Finally, Weisberg (1992) calls into question the circular 
nature of Metcalfe and Weibe’s suggestion that warmth rates be used to determine which 
problems are insight problems.  However, the assertion that participants’ warmth rating 
for insight problems differs from noninsight problems is based on problems that are not 
proven to be insight problems. 
Goswami (2002b) describes insight problem solving as a form of inductive 
reasoning in his chapter on inductive and deductive reasoning.  Inductive reasoning is 
transferring what one knows about the particular and inferring its generalizing.  Goswami 
once again sights the original work of Gestalt psychologists Duncker (1935/1945) and 
Maier (1931) as the psychologist who introduced the theories of functional fixedness and 
insight problem solving.  Additionally, Goswami discusses the debate within the 
literature of whether or not young children are affected by functional fixedness.  To 
illustrate the debate, Goswami cites the work of Brown (1989; Brown, Kane, & Long, 
1989) and German and Defeyter (2000), as discussed below. 
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Knowledge Transfer in Problem-Solving 
Brown (1989) conducted inductive reasoning research with children ages 5 and 9 
using analogies to provide a context for the problems the children were given.  The 
children were to create a tunnel with the given materials to transport various objects for 
the characters in each of the stories.  The tube was to be constructed out of a piece of 
paper.  In the experimental group, the researchers instructed the children to draw pictures 
on their paper prior to receiving the inductive reasoning problem. 
Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) conducted four experiments with children 3 to 10 
years of age to examine the reason for children’s difficulty with transfer studies 
traditionally reported in the literature.  In developing the rationale for their study, Brown, 
Kane, and Long drew attention to the assumption of traditional transfer studies, where the 
researcher presents a series of problems seemingly related to each other in consciousness 
of the his or her mind.  However, Brown et al. theorize the participants, especially 
children, may not see the connection between the problems, based on their different life 
experiences.  Unlike the artificial conditions of a clinical study, the connection between 
the original topic and the analogy is explicitly communicated.  
A second concern Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) have with traditional transfer 
studies is the nature of the knowledge participants are expected to learn and transfer to a 
new problem.  According to Brown et al., the initial knowledge and expected transfer 
knowledge is usually unfamiliar to the participants.  The nature of solving a novel 
problem with novel knowledge is considerably different then what most participants are 
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used to doing.  Generally, people attempt to solve novel problems by applying their 
existing knowledge. 
To test their concerns with traditional transfer studies Brown, Kane, and Long 
(1989) conducted the first experiment the children were assigned one of three groups: 
control group, instructional analogy group, and reminder group.  The three groups 
received the same problems and instructions in an ABAC format.   
In the control group, when the children were unable to solve the first problem 
they were informed that they should move on to the second problem.  When the children 
were unable to solve the second problem, they were shown an illustrated book, which 
included the protagonist solving the second problem.  After seeing how the second 
problem (B) was solved, the participants were reintroduced to the original problem (A).  
If the participants were unable to solve the first problem (A) after their second attempt, 
they were shown an illustrated book with the protagonist solving the problem.  Finally, 
the children were presented with the third problem (C) (Brown, Kane, & Long, 1989). 
In addition to receiving the same instruction and procedure as the control group, 
individuals in the reminder group were consoled after their first failed attempt at problem 
A.  They were told to continue to think about how they could solve the first problem 
while they attempted the second problem.  In the instructional group, the participants 
were again consoled about the difficulty of the first problem and where told explicitly the 
solution to the second problem (B) would help them solve the first problem (A) (Brown, 
Kane, & Long, 1989). 
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The results from the first experiment indicated the advantage of receiving the 
explicit instructions as to the relevant similarity between the first and second solutions.  
The results also indicated the first problem was more difficult for the younger children 
with only 46% of participants successfully applying the solution from the second problem 
to the first.  Finally, most of the children were able to solve the third problem with the 
exception of the younger children in the control group (Brown, Kane, & Long, 1989). 
Due to concerns that the use of paper as an analogous solution is too far removed 
from the materials presented in the stories, Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) conducted a 
second study using a carpet, a rug, and a heavy blanket instead of paper.  However, the 
results of their second study replicated the results of the first study; indicating the 
materials had little effect.  Based on the results to the first two experiments, Brown et al. 
developed a third experiment to determine if younger children would improve their 
transfer if the problem was more familiar. 
Experiment three was conducted with 3-year-olds utilizing the same procedures as 
the first two experiments.  The problems for this experiment were completely different 
from those used in experiments one and two.  The key solution in the three problems for 
this experiment required the use of the concept of stacking and pulling.  Stacking and 
pulling was selected based on prior research that indicates children under the age of two, 
routinely use stacking and pulling to retrieve desired objects.  The results from 
experiment three were similar to the results from the first two experiments, indicating that 
children as young as three are able to transfer across analogous problems (Brown, Kane, 
& Long, 1989).  
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The forth study conducted by Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) was intended to test 
children’s ability to transfer abstract rules from one problem to another.  Experiment 
four, again used 3-year-olds, with each of the children assigned to either the control, 
instructional, or reminder groups.  However, the procedure for experiment four was setup 
differently than the first three experiments.  During the first day of the experiment, the 
children were presented with three stories of animals that used mimicry as a form of 
defense.  Again, the stories were presented in an ABAC procedure.  On the second day, 
the children were presented with two new stories of animals whose environments had 
changed.  In the first problem, the children were asked how the animals could adapt to 
their new environment to protect themselves.  In the second problem, the children were 
asked what happened to the mice that moved to a new environment (where their fur did 
not match the surroundings). 
The results from day one of experiment four, once again suggests that providing 
instructional examples significantly increases student ability to transfer analogous 
solutions.  When the data from experiment four was analyzed against the data from 
experiment three, there was a statistical difference in the 3-year-olds performance when 
using animals then tools.  This difference suggests children will perform better when they 
are tested on a content area they are more familiar with and interested in (Brown, Kane, 
& Long, 1989). 
Despite the statistical improvements in performance demonstrated in day one’s 
data, the first problem on day two (Manchester moths) was determined to be very 
difficult.  Many children were unable to understand the concept of natural selection, even 
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when it was explicitly explained to them.  However, 62% of children who solved the 
pocket mice problem on day two spontaneously mention the similarity between the 
mimicry and the pocket mice problems.  Additionally, 72% of the children who solved 
the problem mentioned the similarity between the moths and pocket mice problem 
(Brown, Kane, & Long, 1989). 
Based on the results from the four studies, Brown, Kane, and Long (1989) 
concluded the use of analogies at any age is an important tool for teaching new 
information.  Second, contrary to previous studies, children as young as 3 are able to 
demonstrate their ability to transfer analogous solutions to new problems.  Although 
Brown, Kane, and Long do not dispute that there are developmental differences between 
children of different ages, they take aim at previous researchers who make the claim 
young children are rigid thinkers unable to transfer knowledge.   
Brown et al. argue the reason traditional studies of transfer, insight, and fixedness 
led to these results is the inappropriate use of problems designed for adults and primates.  
According to Brown, Kane, and Long, many of the problems continuously used by these 
researchers originate from Köhler’s (1927) research on apes.  Finally, Brown et al. argue 
the reason researchers report young children tend to rely on surface perceptions rather 
than on richer relational properties is a result of their limited knowledge of the selected 
problems they are presented. 
Immunity to Functional Fixedness 
As previously stated, Goswami (2002b) highlighted the research debate on the 
effect of fixation on children’s problem solving ability through the juxtaposition of 
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Brown’s (1989) and German and Defeyter’s (2000) research. In contrast, German and 
Defeyter (2000), using a modification of Duncker’s (1935/1945) box problem (originally 
designed for adults), conducted a series of studies to determine whether or not young 
children are immune to the effects of functional fixedness. 
German and Defeyter (2000) conducted a study, based on a modification of 
Duncker’s (1935/1945) box problem, to test their hypothesis that younger children have a 
more fluid idea of the function of objects than older children.  The modified box problem 
is an analogy problem requiring children to assist a 10-centimeters tall bear in retrieving a 
toy from his shelf.  The children were presented with a model of a room made from a 
wooden box (38cm wide x 25cm deep x 58cm high) with the top and sides removed.  A 
toy lion sitting on top of a shelf hanging on the back wall of the box were the only objects 
described as being in the model.  The shelf was 18 centimeters long and 30 centimeters 
off the floor. 
Children were presented with the scenario that the bear needs help retrieving the 
toy lion from the shelf, because he is too short to reach it and cannot jump.  The children 
were presented with a pencil, a ball, a small flat magnet, an eraser, a small toy car, a coin, 
four building blocks (4 cm high), and a wooden box 12 centimeters high.  Half of the 
children ages 5, 6, and 7 were assigned to a preutilization group, which started the 
experiment with all of the items in the 12 centimeter wooden box and placed inside the 
model.  The other half of the children were assigned to the control group, where all of the 
items (including the 12 cm box) were placed next to the model (German & Defeyter, 
2000).    
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The children were given credit for solving the problem when they combined the 
four building blocks and the 12 centimeter wooden box within 180 seconds.  The same 
number of five-year-olds and six-year-olds, 6 out of 10, in the preutilization group met 
the criteria for solving the problem.  Two fewer seven-year-olds in the preutilization 
group, 4 out of 10 were credited with solving the problem.  Were as 8 out of 10 five year 
olds, 9 out of 10 six-year-olds, and 8 out of 9 seven-year-olds in the control group were 
credited with solving the problem (German & Defeyter, 2000). 
German and Defeyter (2000) also reported the average time it took the children to 
reach the required solution.  On average children in the five-year-old preutilization group 
(6 subjects), took 44.5 seconds to develop the excepted solution.  Whereas on average the 
six-year-olds (6 subjects) and seven-year-olds (4 subjects) took 113.8 seconds and 115.3 
seconds respectively.  In the control group, on average the five-year-olds (8 subjects) 
took 55.8 seconds, the six-year-olds (9 subjects) took 50.7 seconds, and the seven-year-
olds (8 subjects) took 28.9 seconds.  Despite the small number of subjects in each age 
group (e.g. 4 seven-year-olds) and relatively small difference in times, German and 
Defeyter conducted a test of significance for the overall trend and between control and 
experimental groups. 
Based on their results, German and Defeyter (2000) argue their study is consistent 
with Duncker’s (1935/1945) idea of functional fixedness.  German and Defeyter also 
make the argument that five-year-olds are immune to functional fixedness based on the 
time results of their study.  On average, the six five-year-olds were 70.8 seconds faster 
than the four seven-year-olds.  To defend their claim German and Defeyter vaguely cite 
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the findings from a replication of their study citing a large number of participants.  
However, the details of the replication or the findings are not presented.  Instead, a poster 
presentation is referenced and percentages supporting their claims are discussed.   
Finally, German and Defeyter (2000) hypothesize why five-year-olds appear to 
have performed better.  One of their ideas is the five-year-olds have an underdeveloped 
understanding of the function of a box as a container.  Their second idea, which they 
believe is the correct idea, is that five-year-olds have a more fluid idea of an objects 
function.  They believe five-year-olds believe the function of an object is whatever the 
user intends the object to be. 
 German and Defeyter (2000) do not directly address the issues raised by 
Weisberg and Alba (1981), about the validity of functional fixedness studies, with the 
exception of a mention of its existence in a footnote.  Secondly, with much of their claims 
based on differences in time, German and Defeyter do not address the difference in 
experimental conditions.  In the control group, all of the items are displayed separately, 
allowing the participant to take a quick visual inventory of the items.  However, in the 
experimental group all of the items are contained within the 12 centimeter box, requiring 
their removal.  Finally, the time it takes to remove the items and the removal process used 
by the children is not addressed in their study. 
More recently, Defeyter and German (2003) conducted two experiments, the first 
to replicate their finding of immunity to functional fixedness in young children and the 
second to test their hypothesis that older children become fixated as a result of an 
emergence of understanding design intent.  In the first experiment children ages five, six, 
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and seven were assigned to a function demonstration group and a control group.  
Children in the function demonstration group were assigned either the long pencil or the 
straw as their target solution object.  
The children were initially introduced to a doll and told he was going on a voyage 
through space.  The function of the target objects, a long pencil and a straw, were 
demonstrated to the children in the function demonstration group.  After the functional 
demonstration, the distracter objects were presented to the children without a 
demonstration of their function.  Before being presented with the problem, the children 
were asked to state the function of the two demonstrated items.  To be scored as being 
correct, the children had to explain the function of the object that had been demonstrated 
to them.  The children were then shown the clear plastic tube and asked to help the doll 
get the stuffed animal out of the tube.  If the children were able to retrieve the stuffed 
animal from the tube, they were to explain the demonstrated function of the two objects 
again (Defeyter & German, 2003). 
In the control group, the half of the children received the straw and cup first 
followed by the pencil and paper and the other half received the pencil and paper first.  
For both control groups, the straw and cup were placed on the table with one distracter 
item in between them.  The pencil and paper were place on the other side of the table 
with one distracter item separating them.  After the items were presented, the children 
were told the same story as the function demonstration group and asked to help the doll 
retrieve the stuffed animal from the tube (Defeyter & German, 2003). 
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Children were scored on whether or not they selected the target object first and on 
the duration to solve the problem.  In the function demonstration groups 8 out of 20 six 
and seven-year-olds selected the target object first, where as 12 out of 20 five-year-olds 
selected the target object first.  In the control groups, 16 out of 20 five and six-year-olds 
selected the target object first, where as 19 out of 20 seven-year-olds selected the target 
object first.  The post-hoc analysis of the difference in duration between age groups 
indicated no significant difference between the five-year-olds and the seven-year-olds.  
Although, the post-hoc analysis did determine five-year-olds were faster than six-year-
olds.  Unfortunately, the specific times were not presented outside a graph, which 
indicates on average five-year-olds took approximately five seconds and six-year-olds 
took between 20 and 25 seconds (Defeyter & German, 2003). 
The procedures and problem for the second experiment were identical to the first 
experiment.  Children ages five, six, and seven were assigned to a function demonstration 
group and a control group.  Instead of presenting familiar objects to the children, the 
researchers created novel objects similar in size and shape as the objects used in the first 
experiment.  Finally, as in the first experiment, the functional demonstration group was 
presented with the function of two pairs of novel objects (Defeyter & German, 2003). 
Defeyter and German (2003) argue the results from the two experiments replicate 
their earlier study (German & Defeyter, 2000), which found five-year-olds have an 
immunity to functional fixedness.  Defeyter and German argue the results from the 
second experiment supports their theory that functional fixedness is a result of knowing 
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an objects functional design.  This is in contrast to prior literature, which suggests 
functional fixedness is a result of negative transfer from prior knowledge. 
In summarizing, the arguments put forth by German and Defeyter (2000), “close 
attention will have to be paid to the nature of the function to be learned, the existing state 
of the child’s conceptual system, and the context in which the new function is first 
encountered if German and Defeyter’s hypothesis about immunity to fixedness in 
younger children is to be tested adequately” (Goswami, 2002b, p288). 
Negative Transfer on Problem-Solving 
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) conducted two experiments to study the negative 
transfer effect of using negative examples of design in the presentation of a problem-
solving task.  Undergraduate students were assigned to either the control group, fixation 
group, or defixation group.  Individuals in the fixation group were presented with an 
example of a negative design solution and an explanation of why it was a poor design.  
Individuals in the defixation group were also presented with an example of a negative 
design, but were also specifically instructed to avoid making the same error.  Chrysikou 
and Weisberg concluded the inclusion of a negative example did lead to negative transfer 
to individual’s solutions, often referred to as fixation.  However, if instructions to avoid 
using the design error in their solutions were provided, individuals did not negatively 
transfer the error. 
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Mitigating Fixedness 
Chrysikou and Weisberg (2006) conducted a study to determine the effect of 
alternative categorization tasks on seven traditional insight problems.  Undergraduate 
students were assigned to one of four groups, two treatment groups and two control 
groups.  Prior to the insight problem solving tasks, participants in the first control group 
completed the Embedded Figures Test (EFT), which has been shown to improve 
performance on insight problems.  The second control group completed the Word 
Association test, which has not been shown to improve insight problem solving 
performance.  The first treatment group completed the Alternative Categorization Task 
(ACT), where the participants list alternative categories for 12 common items.  The 
second treatment group completed the Alternative Categorization Task with critical items 
task (ACT-C).  The critical items are the critical items used for the solutions of the 
insight problems.  At the beginning and end of instruction for the insight problem-solving 
phase, the individuals in the ACT, EFT, and ACT-C groups were instructed to remember 
the thought process they utilized during the pre-problem solving phase because it may 
help them with the insight problems. 
Individuals in the two alternative categorization groups performed significantly 
better then individuals in the two control groups.  There was no significant difference 
between the two alternative categorization groups suggesting the improvement in 
performance was not affected by the inclusion of problem specific items (Chrysikou, 
2006).  The results were consistent with their pilot study, in which Chrysikou and 
Weisberg (2004) concluded problem solving is a goal-derived categorization process.  
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Additionally, when confronted with ill-defined problems, such as an insight problem, ad-
hoc categorization is employed in the absences of a familiar context.  Finally, receiving 
training in developing ad-hoc categorization (ACT & ACT-C) can improve problem-
solving performance when presented with an insight problem (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 
2004; Chrysikou, 2006). 
Similar to Chrysikou’s (2006) alternative categorization task, Flavel, Cooper, and 
Loiselle (1958) conducted an experiment to determine whether an increase in atypical 
pre-utilization of an object would mitigate the effects of functional fixedness.  
Participants were divided into one control group and five experimental groups.  In each 
of the experimental groups, the participants pre-utilized the target object in a typical 
function; in addition, the participants in four of the experimental groups also pre-utilized 
the object in one, two, three, or four atypical functions.  The results of the experiment 
indicated the more a participant pre-utilized the function of the object in an atypical way, 
the less likely an effect of functional fixedness would be observed.  In other words, as 
with Chrysikou’s (2006) alternative categorization task, Flavel, Cooper, and Loiselle’s 
(1958) experiment indicates that divergent thinking can mitigate functional fixedness. 
Flavel, Cooper, and Loiselle (1958) and Chrysikou (2006), provide a possible 
solution for reducing the effects of fixation, by requiring participants to complete a 
divergent thinking exercise prior to receiving the fixation problem.  However, if fixation 
has already occurred, Storm and Angello (2010) suggest that participants need to forget 
the idea that they have become fixated on, which Smith and Blankenship (1991) suggest 
may be a function of time between when the fixation occurs and when the problem is 
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solved.  In their experiments, participants performed significantly better on the word 
association task if they were allowed time away from the problem, than if they attempted 
the problem immediately after becoming fixated.  Smith and Blankenship’s results 
support earlier research conducted by Adamson and Taylor (1954), in which the 
reduction of functional fixedness was a result of retroactive inhibition, which increased as 
the time between the pre-utilization and the problem solving task increased.  Adamson 
and Taylor concluded that the mitigation of functional fixedness was not merely a result 
of time, but that the distractions of other activities during the time delay, causes the 
participant to forget about the fixation.  
Another possible means for mitigating functional fixedness was examined by 
Glucksberg and Weisberg (1966), to determine if functional fixedness is a result of 
participants’ perceptual observations. Glucksberg and Weisberg conducted three 
experiments that included labeling all of the objects, partially labeling the objects, or not 
labeling the objects.  In the first experiment, the participants were provided one of three 
illustrations of the objects (all objects labeled, no objects labeled, and only the word tacks 
printed on the side of the box) that could be used to solve Duncker’s (1935/1945) candle 
problem.  Participants who were given the illustration with all of the objects labeled were 
significantly more likely to include the word box in their first answer.  However, the 
differences between the groups were no longer significant when considering all of the 
participants’ solutions (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). 
 The second experiment assigned participants into three groups in which they saw 
one of the three illustrations from experiment one (all objects labeled, no objects labeled, 
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and the word tacks printed on the side of the box), while they received recorded 
instructions.  While the illustration was displayed for ten seconds to the participants, an 
experimenter removed the cover, revealing the objects.  Manipulating the objects to solve 
the candle problem, the time participants took to use the box in their solution was 
recorded.  If the participants failed to use the box within 15 minutes, they were assigned a 
time of 15 minutes (Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966).   
Coinciding with results from the first experiment, participants who received an 
illustration with all of the objects labeled performed significantly faster, which indicated 
that providing the cue of labeling the box reduced the effect of functional fixedness.  The 
third experiment was identical to the second experiment, except the instruction to not 
allow the wax to drip on the floor was removed from the recording.  The results of the 
third experiment were consistent with the results from the second experiment, which 
indicated that participants, who saw an illustration with all of the objects, took 
significantly less time to use the box in their solution than the other participants 
(Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966). 
Categorization 
 In recent years, researchers have indicated that categorization, memory, context, 
prior experience, and knowledge transfer all influence the relative success or failure of an 
individual’s attempt to solve a problem. 
Categorization is the process individuals use to organize their memories of 
encountered stimuli based on discriminate differences.  Categorical representation is a 
term used to describe the structure, which contains the information about a particular 
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category.  The importance of categorization includes the efficient and accurate retrieval 
of information, the ability to reduce the need to store every stimulus into separate 
memories, and it simplifies novel stimuli allowing for an instant familiarization (Quinn, 
2002).    
One area of research within categorization analyzes whether or not children and 
adults differ in their application or flexibility of different types of categorization.  Some 
research suggests that children are more flexible in their application of categorization, 
which could lead to greater flexibility in problem-solving.  Other research suggests that 
there is no difference in children’s flexibility in applying categorization modes.  
According to Kalish (2007), very little is understood about how children apply their 
selection of categorization modes, whether it be flexible or rigid, to different 
categorization tasks. 
Kalish (2007), conducted an experiment in which two groups of children, four- to 
five-year-olds and seven- to eight-year-olds, were presented with two sets of pictures, one 
of animals and the other of tools.  For each animal picture, participants were presented 
with some additional perceptual information as to the animals’ disposition and physical 
ability, such as an ability to climb.  For each tool picture, participants were presented 
with some additional perceptual information as to the tools functional affordance and 
material composition.  The participants were then presented with a brief scenario and a 
forced choice question that required the participants to choose between two animals or 
two tools.  The forced choice questions were developed to examine children’s flexibility 
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in assigning membership to objects in different categorization tasks, such as species 
identification, animal disposition, functional affordance, etc.  
The Rosch framework on categorization argues the world is naturally ordered into 
distinguishable categories, such as the characteristics of birds versus animals.  This 
natural order enables young infants to develop categories prior to their demonstrated 
understanding of language.  Infants as young as three months, have demonstrated their 
ability to categorize stimuli through familiarization / novelty-preference experiments.  
Although many modern researchers agree on the earl existence of categorization, there is 
not yet agreement on the developmental differences between infants and adults.  One 
explanation for the increased sophistication of adult’s categorization is the increase in 
overall knowledge through experiences (Quinn, 2002). 
Infants younger than two years of age, demonstrate the ability to distinguish 
causal and noncausal relationships and demonstrate a preference for causal properties in 
categorization (Booth, 2008).   Iachini, Borghi, and Senese (2008), as a result of their 
three experiments, concluded individuals place more importance on properties of 
function and interaction.  Ahn (1998) concluded the central criteria for categorization 
remains the same for natural and artificial causal properties. 
Functional Affordance 
According to Hernik and Csibra (2009), adults, as well as young children, 
naturally categorize objects according to the object’s function.  Therefore, in order to 
understand how children categorize objects, researchers, such as Asher and Kemler 
Nelson (2008), German and Johnson (2002), Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson 
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(2010), etc. have conducted studies on functional affordance, how children determine the 
function of an object.  Being able to better understand how children determine the 
function of an object, will lead to a better understanding of how children categorize 
objects, which will lead to a better understanding how children select objects to use 
during a problem solving task, which could provide an explanation for why certain 
problem solving tasks lead to an observed condition of functional fixedness. 
Much like problem solving and categorization research, functional affordance 
research is dependant on the quality of the methodology used by the researcher in order 
to ensure that the results truly reflect the young child’s thought process.  Therefore, a 
large variety of methodologies have been used in an attempt to determine young 
children’s functional affordance, which leads to conflicting results. 
One topic of debate within functional affordance research is whether children and 
adults demonstrate a preference for the labeling of an objects function based on its 
current use or its intended (designed) use.  Kelemen (1999) conducted a series of studies 
to examine whether young children demonstrate a preference toward the designed or 
intended function of an object versus the objects use.  
The discussion within the literature of functional intent takes on a debate as to 
whether the results are due to children’s understanding of design intent or functional 
intent or are the results related to children’s linguistic understanding.  Matan (1995) 
concluded that preschoolers interpret the word ‘does’ to mean the same as the phrase 
‘what is it for’.  Matan’s conclusion suggests that the results of functional intent have 
more to do with children’s linguistic intent rather than their beliefs or cognitive 
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understanding of functional intent.  Kelemen (1999) also raised the question of whether 
her results, that preschoolers tended to assign functional purpose to natural whole objects 
more indiscriminately than adults, could be interpreted as a difference in children and 
adults’ linguistic understanding of function.  Kelemen’s third study presented an 
experiment to analyze if there was any significant difference in preschoolers and adults’ 
biases towards the original function of an object or the alternative function of an object or 
a body part.  Kelemen’s results indicated that there was no significant difference between 
adults and preschoolers’ understanding of the linguistic question ‘what is it for?’  
Kelemen’s study also indicates that children and adults do not have a significant 
difference in their conceptual understanding of functionality.  In other words, 
preschoolers and adults have a similar understanding that if an object has an original 
intended function, then that intended function does not change simply because it is used 
in an alternative way. 
Kelemen’s (1999) first two studies also indicated that preschoolers were 
significantly more likely to assign functionality to all categories of living, non-living, 
naturally occurring, and human made objects.  However, preschoolers were also more 
likely to assign functionality to parts of living things, such as a tiger paw, over whole 
living things, such as the tiger.  So the question becomes why, if children and adults seem 
to have a similar understanding of the concept of function as indicated in Kelemen’s third 
experiment, then why are children more likely to assign a function to naturally occurring 
whole objects like mountains then adults?  
 56 
One explanation that Kelemen (1999) presents is that young children lack the 
understanding of the origin of naturally occurring objects, such as mountain ranges.  In 
the absents of understanding the origin of naturally occurring objects, children may 
possess the belief that someone or something had to have created it for a particular 
purpose.  In a related study, Gelman and Kramer (1991) determined young children 
accurately distinguish between naturally occurring objects, such as the sun, and human 
constructed objects, such as a chair.  However, their research also suggested that young 
children often lack the understanding of how natural occurring objects are created, 
resulting in an inability to articulate the natural cause beyond the fact people were not 
involved.   
A second explanation for Kelemen’s (1999) results could be related to the 
linguistic use of the phrase ‘what is it for’ as discussed previously.  Kemler Nelson, Egan, 
and Holt’s (2004) determined that when young children, two-, three-, and four-years-old, 
ask the somewhat ambiguous question ‘what is it?’ they are more likely to be seeking an 
explanation of the objects intended function rather than the name of the object.  Based on 
the results from Kemler Nelson and O’Neil’s (2005) research, parents are acutely aware 
that if their child knows the name of an object, then they are also likely to know the 
function of the object.  Their research also indicated that a child may know the function 
of an object, but not necessarily the name of the object.  However, it is very unlikely that 
the child will know the name of the object without knowing the function of the object, 
indicating that the function of an object is more important to the child’s conceptual 
understanding of the object than the name of the object. 
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Additionally, parents appear to be intuitively aware of their child’s understanding 
of objects, to the point that if a child asks the question ‘what is it?’ and the parent 
believes the child is familiar with the function of the object or the functional category of 
the object, the parent will only provide the name of the object.  By providing the name of 
the object, the parent is making the assumption that the name will provide sufficient 
information for the child to recognize the function of the object.  However, if the parent 
believes the child is not familiar with the function of the object, then the parent will 
provide the function of the object or the functional category of the object, in addition to 
the name.  It is very unlikely that the parent would only provide the name of the object, if 
they believed the child did not already know the function of the object.  Consequently, if 
the parent’s response to the child’s question ‘what is it?’ did not provide the necessary 
information for the child to understand the function of the object, the child asked a 
follow-up question that explicitly requested more information about the object’s function.  
Twelve of the thirteen follow-up questions that the children asked explicitly requested 
information on the object’s function (Kemler Nelson & O’Neil, 2005). 
Given the results of Kemler Nelson and O’Neil (2005) that young children 
possess an affinity for the function of objects, it seems plausible to draw a connection 
between a child’s understanding of an object’s function and the manner in which the 
child categorizes objects.  Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, and Blair (2000) 
concluded that young children, like adults, will use the function as a means of 
categorizing objects, especially when the object’s function appears plausible.  Given time 
to explore the function of an object and given the object’s appearance provides clear 
clues to the objects function, even two-year-olds are more likely to use functional 
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affordance in categorizing novel objects, than simply using perceivable similarities 
(Kemler Nelson, 1999; Kemler Nelson, Russell, & Jones, 2000).  By age two, children 
have learned to generalize that objects with the same name tend to have the same 
function (Kemler Nelson, Russel, & Jones, 2000). 
Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson (2010) conducted a study with two- 
and three-year-olds in which they concluded the children were more likely to consider the 
demonstrated function of an object to be the conventional function of that object, when 
the experimenter intentionally used the object, rather than when the experimenter 
accidentally used the object.  Thereby indicating that young children understand that the 
designed intent is what determines the correct function of an object.  The young children 
were also more likely to except the demonstrated function of an object to be the 
conventional function of that object when the experimenter consistently used the object in 
the demonstrated manner.  Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson’s research 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the children’s assumption of 
conventional function based on the child’s age. 
In a second experiment, Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson (2010) 
sought to determine if two- and three-year-olds would indicate that others’ should also 
take into consideration the intentional or accidental function of an object.  In the second 
experiment, the children observed a video of someone using the object in a manner in 
which they indicated satisfaction (intentional use) and someone using the object in a 
manner in which they indicated unsatisfaction, by shaking their head and saying oops 
(accidental use).  Following the video, the experimenter, using one of two puppets, had 
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one of the puppets replicate the intentional function of the object and one of the puppets 
replicate the accidental use of the object.  The experimenter then asked the children three 
questions, which puppet used the object correctly, how would the child use the object, 
and which puppet would the child like to play with.   
The results indicated the three-year-olds were more likely than the two-year-olds 
to indicate that the puppet, who used the object according to the intentional use, was 
correct.  Three-year-olds were also more likely to indicate that they would want to play 
with the puppet who used the object according to the intended function, thus supporting 
earlier research on social behavior (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008), which indicates 
children want to associate with others who they perceive are following social norms.  
Despite three-year-olds’ greater tendency to apply their functional reasoning to others, 
the experiment did not find a significant difference between the two- and three-year-olds’ 
personal preference for using the object according to the intentional or accidental use 
(Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, & Markson, 2010).   
Both age groups did not perform at a level greater than chance, indicating no 
preference for whether or not they should use the object according to the accidental or 
intentional function.  One possible explanation of why the children in the second 
experiment did not indicate a preference for the intended function, could be do to the 
change in methodology.  Following the video in which the actors indicated that they 
accidently or intentionally used the object in a specific manner, the children then watched 
the two puppets intentionally replicate the accidental and intentional function of the 
object, without indicating expressing that one of them made a mistake.  The researchers 
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stated that this may have created some confusion within the children as to which function 
they should replicate (Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson, 2010). 
German and Johnson’s (2002) approach to studying children’s understanding of 
an objects functional affordance focused on whether or not children possessed the 
concept of design stance, in other words regardless of what the object is currently being 
used for, what was the object designed to do.  In German and Johnson’s study, 
participants were presented with four stories about a novel object.  For each story, the 
participants were presented a picture of the novel object and informed that “a long time 
ago an inventor…” (German & Johnson, 2002, p284) made the object to perform a 
specific function.  After the child recited the original function back to the researcher, the 
participant was read a second story in which the current owner either intentionally uses 
the object for a different function, on an ongoing bases, or while in the possession of the 
new owner was accidentally used for a different function.  After the alternative function 
was presented to the children, they were asked to repeat the function to the researcher.  
The researcher then summarized the two functions of the object and the condition in 
which they were used, which the participant again repeated. 
After repeating the two functions of the object, the participants were asked to 
choose which function the object was really for.  The adult participants were given the 
same four stories, however, the method in which they received the stories was different.  
The adult participants were given the stories in a written format, without the picture cues, 
in a booklet in which they wrote their answers to the prepared questions.  Based on their 
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results, German and Johnson (2002) concluded that young children, five-year-olds, lack 
the competence to understand the design stance. 
Defeyter, Hearing, and German (2009) conducted two additional experiments, in 
the first experiment which was designed to replicate the German and Johnson (2002) 
study, in which participants shown line drawings of novel objects and told that the object 
was designed for one purpose but used by everyone for a second purpose.  The 
participants were then asked to determine what the object “really” was for.  The second 
experiment, also replicated the procedures of German and Johnson’s experiment, except 
instead of asking the participants what the object was really ‘for’, the participants were 
asked to indicate what the correct name of the object was (e.g. “What is it really? Is it a 
bottle carrier or a fish catcher?” (Defeyter, Hearing, & German, 2009, p263)).  According 
to the researchers, by asking the participants to state the correct name of the object, the 
participants had to determine the correct categorization of the object not the functional 
use of the object. 
The results of Defeyter, Hearing, and German’s (2009) first experiment, similar to 
German and Johnson (2002), indicated that adults based their decision on the true 
function of an object according to the designer’s intended function.  Where as children 
did not indicate a preference for, either the designer’s intended function or the current use 
of the object, greater than chance.  In other words, the children selected the designer’s 
intended use and the current use at a statistically equal level.  However, in Defeyter, 
Hearing, and German’s (2009) second experiment, children in the idiosyncratic condition 
were more likely to select the true name of an object, as the name reflecting the 
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designer’s intended function, rather than the name reflecting the current use of the object.  
The researchers believe their results indicated that children are unable to privilege the 
designer when making judgments about function or categorization, when they believe the 
majority of people use an object for an intended function.  However, children are able to 
privilege the designer when making judgments about categorization when told one 
individual uses the object in an alternative function. 
Despite German and Johnson’s (2002) conclusion, Asher and Kemler Nelson 
(2008), based on their research with three- and four-year-olds, concluded that young 
children understand that the true function of an artifact is the function that the object was 
designed for.  In other words, in contradiction to German and Johnson’s research, Asher 
and Kemler Nelson’s study indicates that young children do possess the competence to 
understand the design stance.   
As stated earlier, one possible explanation for the conflicting results could be the 
differences in methodology between the two studies.  In the German and Johnson (2002) 
and Defeyter, Hearing, and German (2009) studies, the participants were shown pictures 
of objects and asked to answer a specific question “what is it really used for?”, which 
requires the participant to interpret the question to mean what was the object originally 
designed to do.  However, in the Asher and Kemler Nelson (2008) study, the participants 
selected physical objects from around the room and when the participant asked a function 
related question or a more general question of what is it, the experimenter would provide 
a corresponding answer relating to the objects plausible or implausible function.  In 
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addition, the experimenter would demonstrate the corresponding plausible or implausible 
function.   
The participants in both the plausible and implausible condition were allowed to 
ask follow-up questions, for which correct information was provided regardless if the 
participant was in the plausible or implausible condition.  In the implausible condition, if 
the participant’s question was not able to be answered with truthful information, such as 
the question “what else can it be used for?”, then the experimenter would tell the 
participant that “the person who made [the object] made it to [do the plausible function]” 
(Asher & Kemler Nelson, 2008, p478).  The participant’s questions and follow-up 
questions were then analyzed; compared across the two age groups and between 
conditions (plausible and implausible).  According to Asher and Kemler Nelson’s results, 
participants were significantly more likely to ask additional questions regarding the 
function of the object, when the demonstrated function and the participant’s questions 
were answered with an implausible function.  Therefore, as stated earlier, Asher and 
Kemler Nelson concluded that young children do have a conceptualization of design 
stance. 
A study conducted by Kemler Nelson, Holt, and Egan (2004), provides additional 
support for the possibility that the research methodology and young children’s command 
of language could play a role in the debate as to whether or not young children possess 
the ability to conceptualize design intent as it relates to functionality.  The study 
presented two- and three-year-olds with familiar objects, such as a cup, where the objects 
were either broken in a manner in which the object would no longer perform its intended 
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function or the object appeared to be intentionally altered, rendering the usual function 
inoperable.   
Unlike other studies, such as German and Johnson (2002), and Wohlegelernter, 
Diesendruck, and Markson (2010), participants in Kemler Nelson, Holt, and Egan (2004) 
were not presented with a story that explained one alteration was done accidently and the 
other was done intentionally.  Nor were the participants asked to identify which object 
represented the true function of the object.  Instead, the participants were handed the 
objects and asked to state what he / she would call the objects.  Two- and three-year-olds 
were more likely to give a name to the accidentally altered objects (broken items) than 
the intentionally altered objects that were similar to the category of the original object, 
such as a cup.  Kemler Nelson, Holt, and Egan concluded children as young as two-years-
old, not only take into consideration the function of an object when determining its 
categorization, but also in the absents of a narrative, which explicitly stated the objects’ 
intentional or accidental alternation, are able to use their observational reasoning skills to 
consider the intended function of an object. 
A second possible explanation for why researchers, such as German and Johnson 
(2002), who concluded young children lack the ability to understand the design stance, 
and other researchers, such as Kemler Nelson, Holt, and Egan (2004), who concluded 
young children are able to understand the design stance, find conflicting results may have 
to do with the complexity of determining whether to use inductive reasoning based on 
their own observations or whether to use social norms to determine categorization 
(Kalish, 2007). 
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In Casler and Kelemen’s (2005) study, both preschoolers and adults demonstrated 
a learned preference for choosing a novel tool to complete a specific task, after being 
taught the tool’s function by an adult.  The results of their second experiment also 
indicated that children as young as two-years-old recognize that the learned intentional 
function of a novel object should also be used by others in the same fashion even though 
they were not taught the intended functions. 
Summary 
 According to the research presented in this chapter, an immerging theory 
within cognitive development, over the past few decades, indicates that the physical 
structure and basic cognitive functions of the brain are present from birth and that the 
demonstrated differences across developmental age groups can be attributed to the 
individual’s diverse life experiences (Murphy, 2002).  The current study is focused 
specifically on cognitive development within the context of problem solving involving 
the manipulation of physical objects.  Therefore, the literature review analyzed a variety 
of factors that potentially impacts the development of one’s problem solving ability, over 
a large age range.  
 Research into the exhibited differences in individual problem solving success, 
indicates that a person’s experience within the specific context of the problem space has a 
positive correlation with the individual’s success (Flesher, 1993).  In research focused 
specifically on the differences between novices and experts, experts are able to use their 
superior understanding of the problem space, proven solution strategies, and greater 
context specific prior knowledge, to out perform novice problem solvers, who are often 
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doing little more then using an educated guess (Ball, Ormerod, & Morley, 2004; Collins, 
& Gentner, 1987; Cross, 2004).  Therefore if experience plays an important role in 
problem solving, then it is important to understand the degree to which infants and young 
children are able to successfully solve problems, given their limited life experiences. 
 Despite their seemingly little life experiences, young children (Want & Harris, 
2001) and even infants as young as 5-months-old (von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Feng, & 
Rosander, 1998; McCarty, Clifton, Ashmead, Lee, & Goubet, 2001) are able to 
demonstrate an ability to successfully analyze a problem and utilize an effective problem 
solving strategy to accomplish their goals.  When a problem is presented in a familiar 
context, with a familiar goal, such as feeding oneself, infants and young children are able 
to use their prior knowledge to effectively solve a problem, much the same as older 
children and adults. 
 Therefore, based on the notion that infants and young children are capable of 
successfully completing problem solving tasks, the literature review narrowed in focus to 
insight problem solving. The term, insight problem, refers to a type of problem where the 
solution seems to just appear in the participant’s mind without using a known problem 
solving strategy, as if by insight (Goswami, 2002b; Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987).  Insight 
problems have been used for decades to study a phenomenon in problem solving called 
functional fixation, in which a participant’s prior use of an object in one function will 
create a mental block to using that object in a different function, even when it is the 
seemingly obvious component to the solution for a person who has not been 
preconditioned to its function (Duncker, 1935/1945; Maier, 1931).  
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One possible explanation for the fixation on an object’s function maybe the result 
of cognitive efficiency, in both why people categorize objects (Quinn, 2002), and why 
people negatively transfer a problem solving strategy from one context to another 
(Chrysikou, & Weisberg, 2005).  The categorization of an object allows an individual to 
create a generalizable memory of an object’s characteristics, thereby eliminating the need 
to store a separate memory for each similar object (Quinn, 2002).   
Finally, research by German and Defeyter (2000) indicated that young children 
exhibit immunity to the effects of functional fixation in problem solving.  Therefore, the 
current study was set up to examine whether or not children demonstrate the functional 
fixation phenomenon when they are presented with a problem that requires them to pre-
utilize an object in a familiar function. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Introduction 
 The purpose of the study is to understand the differences in children’s thought 
processes as they develop solutions to technological problems.  The specific aspects of 
problem solving the study will focus on are: the existence of functional fixedness in 
technological problem-solving, understanding how functional fixedness affects children’s 
development of solutions, and the differences of functional fixedness in children pre-
kindergarten to ninth grade.  Previous research involving problem-solving and functional 
fixedness used various forms of verbal protocol analysis. 
Design of the Study 
Population 
 Data was collected in three small communities located in Upstate New York, near 
Syracuse.  The preschool was located on a university campus, although it is run 
independently from the university.  The second grade and ninth grade students attend the 
same small school district nearby, although the schools are located in two different rural 
communities.  According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the city where the preschool is located 
has a population of approximately 18,000 people, where as the two townships that make 
up the school district where the second grade and ninth grade students attend consists of 
approximately 9,600 people. 
The preschool is a non-profit National Association for the Education of Young 
Children certified program, serving children from age 18 months to 5-years-old.  The 
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curriculum is developed by teachers who possess a Masters degree in early childhood 
education.  The children are grouped according to three age categories: 18 months to 2-
years-old (toddlers), 2-years-old to 3-years-old (toddlers), and 3-years-old to 5-years-old 
(preschoolers), with the preschoolers divided between two classrooms.  For the purpose 
of this study, only 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to participate in the study.  Twelve 
children agreed to participate in the study, 8 girls and 4 boys. 
The school district in which the second and ninth grade students attend consists of 
about 2,700 students in a rural community located in central New York.  Twelve second 
grade students agreed to participate in the study, 8 girls and 4 boys.  Twelve ninth grade 
students agreed to participate in the study, 5 girls and 7 boys. 
Problem Description 
 The problem solving activity was based on the problem used in German and 
Defeyter’s (2000) study, where the participants were asked to assist a character in the 
retrieval of an object within a model of a room.  The model room, constructed out of 3/8” 
plywood, was 12-11/16” W x 10-3/4” L x 11-7/16” H with three walls, a floor, and an 
open ceiling.  A 3-5/8” x 1-7/8” shelf was located in the upper left corner 11” inches 
above the floor.  Located on the shelf was a small plastic dog.  The participants were 
presented with the scenario that the 4-1/4” tall character, named Kennedy, needed help 
getting her dog down from the shelf.   
The participants were told Kennedy could not jump very high but that they could 
use any of the items they were given by the researcher to help Kennedy get her dog down 
from the shelf.  The objects that the participants were given to assist Kennedy were: a 4” 
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x 4” x 3-13/16” box, three wooden blocks 1-1/4” cubed, two rubberbands, two paper 
clips, a 4” piece of twine, a 4” broken pencil, a toy jeep, a pencil top eraser, and a 4” 
diameter plastic ball.  The shelf was placed at a height that would only allow the 
character to reach it using the box and three blocks.  The participants were encouraged to 
continue to work on solving the problem until he/she declared that they had solved the 
problem. 
Fixated and Nonfixated Condition 
 Participants were given the objects that they could use to solve the problem in 
either a fixated condition or a nonfixated condition.  The targeted object, in other words 
the fixated object, was a 4” x 4” x 3-13/16” box that when it was presented in the fixated 
condition, meant that the participants used the box in its typical function, a container.  In 
both the fixated and nonfixated condition, the objects were always presented in the same 
order, with the 4” x 4” x 3-13/16” box being the first object given to the participants.  
After asking the participants to explain what the object was, a box, and its typical 
function, to hold things, in the fixated condition the participants were asked to place all of 
the remaining objects inside the box after they explain what it was and its typical 
function.  In the nonfixated condition, the participants did not place the objects inside the 
box, instead they set the box off to the side along with all of the remaining objects. 
Alternative Categorization Task 
 Half of the participants in each age group were asked to complete an alternative 
categorization task, based on Chrysikou and Weisberg’s (2006) study in which they 
studied the effect of an alternative categorization task on undergraduate students’ 
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performance on seven traditional insight problems.  For the alternative categorization 
task, participants were presented a list of 12 common items and asked to generate a list of 
alternative uses for the objects. 
 The alternative categorization task used in this research presented participants 
with a list of eight objects that children ages 4 to 15 years of age would be familiar with 
and would have had experience using the items in unintended ways.  Before the 
participants were asked to generate their list of alternative uses for the eight objects, the 
researcher gave them an example of how a newspaper could be used for a variety of uses, 
such as a paper hat, a boat, to line a drawer, to roll up and smash a bug, etc. 
Following the example of the newspaper, the participants were asked to state all 
of the uses they could think of for each of the eight objects: shoe, paper, paper/Styrofoam 
plate, ball, hat, marker, broom, and hammer.  The list of objects were presented to each 
participant in the same order; following each of the participant’s responses the researcher 
stated “okay, what else could you use the object for.”  The researcher would continue the 
request for additional uses until the participant stated they could not think of any 
additional ideas, then the participants were given the next item on the list until the list 
was exhausted. 
Four Participation Groups 
 The participants were assigned to one of four groups (AF, AN, F, and N), based 
on whether or not they received the alternative categorization task and whether or not 
they received the problem solving objects in a fixated condition or in a nonfixated 
condition.  Participants in the first group, AF, received the alternative categorization task 
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prior to receiving the objects to be used to solve the problem.  Participants in the AF 
group also received the problem solving objects in the fixated condition.  Participants in 
the second group, AN, also received the alternative categorization task, prior to receiving 
the objects, but in this group the participants received the objects in the nonfixated 
condition.  Participants in the third group, F, did not receive the alternative categorization 
task, and received the objects in the fixated condition.  Participants in the forth group, N, 
also did not receive the alternative categorization task, and received the objects in the 
nonfixated condition. 
Data Collection 
 Participants were audio and video recorded in order to record their verbal 
expression of their thought process and in order to record their actions during the problem 
solving activity. 
Procedural Description 
 The participants were assigned to one of four groups: Alternative categorization 
task and Fixated (AF), Alternative categorization and Nonfixated (AN), Fixated (F), and 
Nonfixated (N).  After providing each participant with a brief explanation of what the 
study was about and what they would be asked to do, the participants were given an 
explanation of why they were going to be audio recorded and video recorded.  Once the 
participants agreed to participate in the study, the participants were given an explanation 
of a think-aloud method, where they would be asked to verbalize their thought process 
throughout their participation.  To practice thinking out-loud, the preschoolers were 
asked to count the number of windows that they saw in the room.  To practice thinking 
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out-loud, the participants in second and ninth grade were asked to think about the first 
floor of their house and count the number of windows on the first floor.  After the 
participants had finished, they were reminded that what they just did was verbalize what 
they were thinking and that they would be asked to continue to verbalize their thought 
process throughout the remainder of their participation. 
 After completing the practice think aloud, the participants in the alternative 
categorization task were given an explanation of how objects can be used for different 
functions other than their intended function.  They were then given an example of how a 
newspaper is typically used for reading information, but it could also be used for a variety 
of other uses, such as folding it into a hat, or a boat, or it could be rolled up to squish a 
bug, etc.  Following this example the participants were told that it was their turn to come 
up with a list of ways you could use different objects.  The participants were verbally 
presented with a list of objects: a shoe, paper, a paper/Styrofoam plate, a ball, a hat, 
markers, a broom, and a hammer.  Object by object, the participants were asked to 
explain what each of the objects could be used for.  After each of the participant’s 
responses, they were told okay what else could it be used for, this continued until the 
participant indicated that they could not think of any other uses for the object. 
 Following the alternative categorization task or following the think aloud practice 
activity for the participants who were not asked to do the alternative categorization task, 
the participants were presented with the objects that they would eventually use to solve 
the problem, although they were not informed of the problem at that time.  All of the 
participants were presented with the objects in the same order and in the same manner.  
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The participants were not informed what the objects would be used for until after they 
had received all of the objects.  For each of the objects, the participants were asked to 
explain what the object was, for instance a box, and what it was typically used for, in the 
case of the box, for putting things inside it.  If the participants did not know what the 
name of the object was, such as the paperclips, the researcher explained what it was.  
Likewise, if the participant did not know what the typical use the object was, the 
researcher provided an explanation. 
The first object that the participants received was the target object, a 4” x 4” x 3-
13/16” paperboard box.  The participants were handed the object and asked to explain 
what the object was and how it was typically used.  Following the participants 
explanation of the box’s function, the participants that were in the fixated groups were 
told that they would put everything else they were given inside the box, thereby creating 
a condition of functional fixedness.  After setting the box to the side, the participants 
were given the second set of objects, 1-1/4” cubed wooden letter blocks.  Following the 
participants’ explanation of the function of the wooden blocks, the participants in the 
fixated groups were instructed to place the blocks inside the box they were previously 
given.  The participants in the nonfixated groups were instructed to set the blocks aside, 
next to the box.  This procedure continued until the participants had received all of the 
objects. 
After the participants received the final object, the plastic ball, they were told that 
they would be able to use any of the things they were just given to solve the following 
problem.  The participants were then presented the 4-1/4” tall doll and told that her name 
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was Kennedy and that she had a problem that they needed to help her solve.  The 
participants were then presented with the model room and told that Kennedy had a 
problem, her dog was stuck on the shelf and that she needed their help to get the dog 
down.  They were told that Kennedy could not jump very high but that they could use 
anything that they were given to help her get her dog down.  The participants were also 
reminded to verbally explain what they were thinking as they attempted to solve the 
problem.  The participants were encouraged to continue working until they had 
developed their best solution or until they could not come up with any other solutions. 
Data Analysis 
 The first variable that was analyzed was whether or not the participants used the 
targeted object, the box, as a part of a viable solution that resulted in the character being 
able to retrieve her dog from the shelf.  A second data variable that was examined was the 
amount of time it took participants to develop a viable solution to the problem, using the 
target object.  If the participant was not able to develop a viable solution using the target 
object, then the total time they spent working on the problem was used for this variable.  
The third variable that was examined was analyzing the differences between the four 
different groups, AF, AN, F, and N.  The forth variable that was examined was an 
analysis of differences between the three age groups. 
 Chi-Square was used to analyze the differences in the in whether or not 
participants used the target object, the box, in their solution. An independent samples T-
tests was used to analyze the differences in the time participants took to solve the 
problem based on the group they were assigned.  An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
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used to analyze the differences in time to solution between age groups.  Finally, a 
nonparametric analysis, the Mann-Whitney U-test, was used to analyze the rank sum 
differences in the time to solution between the participants in the fixated and nonfixated 
conditions. 
Summary 
 In summary, a total of 36 children from three different age groups participated in 
the study.  The children were divided into two groups, a fixated group and a non-fixated 
group.  Within each main group, the participants were subdivided into two additional 
groups, an alternative categorization group and a non-alternative categorization group.
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CHAPTER IV 
Data Analysis 
Research Question One 
Are children impacted by functional fixedness when solving technological problems? 
Hypothesis I 
The first hypothesis states there is no difference in the use of the target object in 
participants’ solutions to the problem, based on the target object being presented to the 
participants in a fixated condition or a nonfixated condition.  Pearson’s Chi-Square was 
used to test the relationship between whether or not participants used the target object and 
whether or not the target object was presented in a fixated or nonfixated condition. 
 As indicated in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, the chi-square analysis of hypothesis I 
indicates the relationship between the target object presented in a fixated or nonfixated 
condition and the participants’ use of the target object in their solution to the problem 
was significant, χ2 = 13.49, p < 0.001. 
Table 4.1 Fixated vs. Nonfixated in use of target object 
Condition 
No box 
in solution 
Used box 
in solution Total 
Nonfixated 4 14 18 
Fixated 15 3 18 
Total 19 17 36 
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Table 4.2 Chi-Square Fixated vs. Nonfixated use of target object in solution 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
χ2 13.486 1 .000 
 
Hypothesis II 
 The second hypothesis states there is no difference in the amount of time 
participants spent solving the problem, based on whether or not the participants used the 
target object.  As indicated in Table 4.3, the participants who did not use the target object 
averaged 260.48 seconds to solve the problem, whereas the participant who used the 
target object in their solution averaged 90.21 seconds to solve the problem.  To test the 
significance of the time difference, an independent sample test was used.  According to 
the Levene’s test for equality of variances, F = 11.852, p = 0.002, equal variances not 
assumed was used to determine the significant difference in the participants’ total time 
spent developing a solution to the problem (Table 4.4).  Therefore, the t-test, t (23.82) 
=3.296, p = 0.003, indicated that the amount of variance in the total time to solution was 
significantly different (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.3 Total Time to Solution: Did Not Use vs. Used Target Object  
Box n Mean SD SEM 
Did not use 19 260.48 208.32 47.79 
Used 17 90.21 80.93 19.63 
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Hypothesis III 
 The third hypothesis states there is no difference in the amount of time 
participants spent solving the problem based on whether they received the objects in the 
 80 
fixated or nonfixated condition.  In analyzing the difference the total time participants 
worked at developing their final solution, the first noticeable difference was the range of 
times.  In the fixated group, participants’ time ranged from 57.10 seconds to 553.50 
seconds, with a mean of 211.12, a standard deviation of 157.60, and a median time of 
178.85 seconds (Table 4.5 and Table A1).   
Table 4.5 Total Time to Solution 
 n M Mdn SD Min Max 
Fixated 18 211.12 178.85 157.60 57.10 553.50 
Nonfixated 18 149.02 69.50 201.34 16.70 819.40 
Nonfixated 
& Used Box 14 86.70 53.65 83.17 16.70 333.00 
 
In contrast, participants’ times in the nonfixated group ranged from 16.70 seconds 
to 819.40 seconds, with a mean of 149.02, a standard deviation of 201.34, and a median 
time of 69.50 seconds (Table 4.5 and Table A2).   
Although the minimum, mean, and median times of the nonfixated group all 
indicate participants who received the target object in a nonfixated state solved the 
problem quicker than participants in the fixated group, the range also illustrates how the 
tendency to solve the problem faster was also depended on the participants’ use of the 
target object.  As illustrated in Table 4.5, when the four participants who did not use the 
box were removed from the descriptive statistics, the range became 16.70 to 333.00, the 
mean became 86.69, the standard deviation became 83.17, and the median time became 
53.65 seconds. 
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 To test the significance of the difference in the amount of time it took participants 
to develop their solution, based on whether or not they received the target object in a 
fixated or nonfixated condition, an independent samples test was initially used to 
compare the groups’ average times.  As indicated by Table 4.6, the difference between 
the average total time participants in the fixated group, 211.12 seconds, spent solving the 
problem was not statistically significant, t(34) = 1.030, p = 0.310, as compared to the 
average total time participants in the nonfixated group spent, 149.02 seconds. 
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 However, the statistical significance of hypothesis I, indicated there was a 
significant difference in whether or not participants used the target object as part of their 
solution, based on whether or not the object is presented in a fixated or nonfixated 
condition.  Additionally, hypothesis II indicated there was a significant difference in the 
average total time participants spent on solving the problem based on whether or not they 
used the target object in their solution.  Based on the statistical significance of both 
hypothesis I and hypothesis II, it was necessary to run a second analysis on the 
significance of hypothesis III; was there a significant difference in the total amount of 
time participants used to solve the problem based on whether the target object was 
presented in a fixated or nonfixated condition.   
Therefore, a nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U-test, was used to examine 
the significance in the distribution of times between the fixated and nonfixated groups.  
The Mann-Whitney U-test is not based on the assumption of a normal distribution of the 
total solution time, rather, it assigns a rank order to the participants total time to solution.  
The use of a rank order system of analysis reduces the effect of participants who took 
approximately 400 seconds longer than any other participants.  Based on the Mann-
Whitney U-test, U = 84.00, p = 0.014, indicates there was a significant difference in 
participants’ total time to solution development, based on whether or not they received 
the target object in the fixated or nonfixated condition (Table 4.7 & Table 4.8). 
Table 4.7 Mann-Whitney U-test: Fixated vs. Nonfixated Time to Solution 
 n Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Nonfixated 18 14.17 255.00 
Fixated 18 22.83 411.00 
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Table 4.8 Mann-Whitney U-test: Fixated vs. Nonfixated Time to Solution 
 Total time to solution 
Mann-Whitney U 84.00 
Wilcoxon W 255.00 
Z -2.468 
Asymp.Sig (2-tailed) .014 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)] .013a 
 
Research Question Two 
Is there a difference in functional fixedness in children from pre-kindergarten to ninth 
grade? 
Hypothesis IV 
 The forth hypothesis states there is no difference in the problem solving 
performance between preschoolers, second graders, and ninth graders.  In order to 
analyze the this hypothesis, participants’ use of the target object and participants’ total 
time to solution was compared across the three age groups.   
The first level of comparison across the three age groups was an analysis of the 
number of participants who used the target object in their solution.  As indicated in Table 
4.9, five out of twelve preschoolers used the target object in their solution, five out of 
twelve second graders used the target object in their solution, and seven out of twelve 
ninth graders used the target object in their solution. 
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Table 4.9 Participants’ Use of Target Object based on Grade Level 
 No Box Used Box Total 
Preschool 7 5 12 
Grade 2 7 5 12 
Grade 9 5 7 12 
Total 19 17 36 
 
 As indicated in Table 4.9, there is no difference in the number of participants who 
used the target object amoung the preschoolers and second graders.  Additionally, as 
indicated in Table 4.10, based on Pearson’s Chi-Square, χ2 = 0.892, p = 0.640, the 
difference between the number of ninth graders who used the target object was not 
statistically different than the number of preschoolers and second graders who used the 
target object. 
Table 4.10 Chi-Square: Participants’ Use of Target Object based on Grade Level 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
χ2 .892a 2 .640 
 
 A comparison across the three age groups as to whether or not participants used 
the target object based on the condition the target object was presented to the participants, 
indicates there was no statistical difference, χ2 = 2.571, p = 0.276 among participants in 
the Nonfixated group and χ2 = 0.000, p =1.00 among participants in the Fixated group 
(Table 4.11 & 4.12). 
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Table 4.11 Use of Target Object Across Age Groups and Condition 
  Preschool Grade 2 Grade 9 Total 
Nonfixated No Box 2 2 0 4 
 Used Box 4 4 6 14 
Total  6 6 6 18 
Fixated No Box 5 5 5 15 
 Used Box 1 1 1 3 
Total  6 6 6 18 
 
Table 4.12 Chi-Square: Across Age Group & Condition 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Nonfixated  χ2 2.571a 2 .276 
Fixated  χ2 .000b 2 1.000 
 
 Similar to the analysis of whether or not participants used the target object across 
the three age groups, a layered approach was used to analyze the total amount of time 
participants spend developing their solutions to the problem.  The first layer of analysis 
examined whether or not there was an overall difference in the average amount of time 
participants spent developing their solutions.  As indicated by Table 4.13 & 4.14, there 
was no statistical difference in the average amount of time participants in each of the age 
groups spent solving the problem, F = 0.023, p = 0.977. 
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Table 4.13 Participants’ average time to solution development within age groups 
 n M SD SE 95% CI Min Max 
Preschool 12 182.93 127.47 36.80 [101.94, 
263.91] 
16.70 446.80 
Grade 2 12 186.49 239.12 69.03 [34.56, 338.42] 50.50 819.40 
Grade 9 12 170.80 174.97 50.91 [59.63, 281.97] 16.90 553.50 
Total 36 180.07 180.96 30.16 [118.85, 
241.30] 
16.70 819.40 
 
Table 4.14 ANOVA 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 1623.86 2 811.93 .023 .977 
Within Groups 1.144E6 33 34680.53   
Total 1.144E6 35    
 
 A second layer of time analysis was used to examine if there was a difference in 
the amount of time participants in the three age groups, based on whether or not they 
used the target object in their solution.  As indicated in Table 4.15 & 4.16, there was no 
significant difference between the three age groups in average amount of time 
participants spent on solution development based on their use of the target object, F = 
0.709, p = 0.509. 
Table 4.15 ANOVA: Time to solution based on use of target object between age groups 
 n M SD SE 95% CI Min Max 
Preschool 5 126.88 131.24 58.69 [-36.08, 
289.84] 
16.70 333.00 
Grade 2 5 71.40 23.77 10.63 [41.88, 100.92] 50.50 103.30 
Grade 9 7 77.44 63.25 23.91 [18.95, 135.94] 16.90 202.80 
Total 17 90.21 80.93 19.63 [48.60, 131.82] 16.70 333.00 
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Table 4.16 ANOVA: Time to solution based on use of target object 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 9633.52 2 4816.76 .709 .509 
Within Groups 95156.56 14 6796.90   
Total 104790.11 16    
 
 As indicated by Table 4.17 and Table 4.18, the there was no significant difference 
in the amount of time participants spent developing their solution across the three age 
groups, based on those that did not use the target object, F = 0.197, p = 0.823. 
Table 4.17 Participants who did not use the target object 
 n M SD SE 95% CI Min Max 
Preschool 7 222.96 117.55 44.43 [114.24, 
331.67] 
132.30 446.80 
Grade 2 7 268.70 292.46 110.54 [-1.78, 539.18] 61.40 819.40 
Grade 9 5 301.50 203.92 91.20 [48.30, 554.70] 107.50 553.50 
Total 19 260.48 208.32 47.79 [160.07, 
360.89] 
61.40 819.40 
 
Table 4.18 ANOVA: Participants who did not use the target object 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 18741.93 2 9370.97 .197 .823 
Within Groups 762418.52 16 47651.16   
Total 781160.45 18    
  
As indicated by Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, there was no significant difference in 
the amount of time participants in each of the three age groups spent on developing their 
solution based on the condition the target object was presented to them, F = 0.989, p = 
0.395. 
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Table 4.19 Participants in the fixated condition across age groups 
 n M SD SE 95% CI Min Max 
Preschool 6 172.82 86.40 35.27 [82.14, 263.49] 57.10 309.00 
Grade 2 6 175.50 179.59 73.32 [-12.97, 
363.97] 
59.90 523.00 
Grade 9 6 285.05 186.79 76.26 [89.03, 481.07] 107.50 553.50 
Total 18 211.12 157.60 37.15 [132.75, 
289.50] 
57.10 553.50 
 
Table 4.20 ANOVA: Participants in the fixated condition across age groups 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 49209.45 2 24604.72 .989 .395 
Within Groups 373048.98 15 24869.93   
Total 422258.43 17    
 
 As indicated in Table 4.21 and Table 4.22, there was no difference in the amount 
of time participants in each of the three age groups spent developing their solution within 
those who received the target object in the nonfixated condition, F = 0.944, p = 0.411. 
Table 4.21 Participants in the nonfixated condition across age groups 
 n M SD SE 95% CI Min Max 
Preschool 6 193.03 167.43 68.35 [17.32, 368.74] 16.70 446.80 
Grade 2 6 197.48 305.37 124.67 [-124.67, 517.95] 50.50 819.40 
Grade 9 6 56.55 33.67 13.75 [21.22, 91.88] 16.90 114.00 
Total 18 149.02 201.34 47.46 [48.90, 249.14] 16.70 819.40 
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Table 4.22 ANOVA: Participants in the nonfixated condition across age groups 
 SS df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 77019.41 2 38509.71 .944 .411 
Within Groups 612095.92 15 40806.40   
Total 689115.33 17    
 
Research Question Three 
Did participants’ completion of an alternative categorization task prior to receiving the 
problem solving task improve their performance, as measured by use of the target object 
and the time to solution? 
Hypothesis V 
The fifth hypothesis states there is no difference in problem solving performance between 
participants who were presented with the alternative categorization task and the 
participants who did not receive the alternative categorization task prior to attempting to 
solve the problem. Pearson’s Chi-Squared was used to test the relationship between 
participants that completed the alternative categorization task before attempting to solve 
the problem and the participants who did not receive the alternative categorization task.   
Table 4.23 Alternative Categorization Task vs. Fixated 
 No Box Used Box Total 
ACT Fixated 8 1 9 
Fixated 7 2 9 
Total 15 3 18 
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Table 4.24 Chi-Square Alternative Categorization vs. Fixated 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
 χ2 .400a 1 .527 
 
In comparing the two groups that received the objects in a fixated condition, the 
Chi-Square χ2 = 0.400, p = 0.527 indicates that there was no significant difference in 
participants’ use of the target object based on whether or not they received the alternative 
categorization task, as displayed in Table 4.23 and 4.24.  In comparing the two groups 
that received the objects in a nonfixated condition, the Chi-Square χ2 = 1.286, p = 0.257 
indicates that there was no significant difference in participants’ use of the target object 
based on whether or not they received the alternative categorization task, as displayed in 
Table 4.25 and Table 4.26.  Finally, an independent sample T-Test was used to determine 
if the participation in the alternative categorization task reduced the effect of fixation on 
the amount of time a participant spent to solve the problem.  As indicated in Table 4.27 
and Table 4.28, there was no significant difference in the amount of time a participant 
spent working on a solution to the problem, t(16) = -0.235, p = 0.817. 
Table 4.25 Alternative Categorization Task vs. Nonfixated 
 No Box Used Box Total 
ACT Nonfixated 1 8 9 
Nonfixated 3 6 9 
Total 4 14 18 
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Table 4.26 Chi-Square Alternative Categorization vs. Nonfixated 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
 χ2 1.286a 1 .257 
 
Table 4.27 Time to Solution for Alternative Categorization Task Fixated vs. Fixated 
 n Mean SD SEM 
ACT Fixated 9 202.12 175.80 58.60 
Fixated 9 220.12 147.29 49.10 
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Summary 
Research Question One 
The first research question, are children impacted by functional fixedness when 
solving technological problems, was examined by analyzing if the way the object was 
presented, in a functional fixated state or a nonfunctional fixated state, would impact the 
likelihood that the participant would use the target object in their solution.  The answer to 
this question was yes, participants were more likely to use the target object in their 
solution if the target object was presented in a functionally nonfixated state (χ2 = 13.49, p 
< 0.001).  The data analysis also indicated that the converse effect also was significant: if 
participants were presented with the target object in a functionally fixated state, then they 
were less likely to use the target object in their solution. 
A second dimension of the effect of functional fixedness was its impact on the 
total amount of time it took participants to develop their solution to the problem.  In 
analyzing the effect on time, the data analysis indicated that participants took 
significantly less time to develop their solution when the target object was presented in a 
nonfunctional fixated state, in particular when the participants used the target object in 
their solution (U = 84.00, p = 0.014). 
Research Question Two 
 The second research question: was there a difference in the effect of functional 
fixedness on participants based on their age.  Based on the data analysis, there was not a 
significant difference in the participants’ likelihood of using the target object (χ2 = 0.892, 
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p = 0.640) or in the amount of time it took participants to develop their solution (F = 
0.023, p = 0.977). 
Research Question Three 
 The third research question: did participants’ completion of an alternative 
categorization task prior to receiving the problem solving task improve their 
performance, as measured by use of the target object and the time to solution.  The data 
analysis of the participants’ likelihood to use the target object (ACT-Fixated vs. Fixated 
Condition χ2 = 0.400, p = 0.527 & ACT-Nonfixated vs. Nonfixated Condition χ2 = 1.286, 
p = 0.257) indicated no significant difference.  The data analysis of the time participants 
spent working on their solution to the problem indicated that the alternative 
categorization task was unable to significantly improve the effect of fixation on the 
participants time to solution (t(16) = -0.235, p = 0.817).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of functional fixedness on 
problem solving with children of varying age levels.  A total of 32 students from three 
age groups, preschool, second grade, and ninth grade participated in the experiment in 
Upstate New York.  The students in each of the three age groups were randomly assigned 
to one of four conditions: alternative categorization task-fixated, alternative 
categorization task-nonfixated, fixated, and nonfixated. 
 Chapter I established a framework for the study by describing the problem that 
little is understood concerning the cognitive and developmental dimensions of 
technological problem solving, specifically when a person becomes fixated on the 
intended use of an object.  Three main research questions were purposed: (1) is there 
measureable evidence that children are impacted by functional fixedness when trying to 
solve a technological problem; (2) is there a measureable difference in the effects of 
functional fixedness in children of different age groups; (3) does the participation in an 
alternative categorization task prior to the problem reduce the effects of functional 
fixedness.   
Chapter II provided a review of the literature on problems solving, functional 
fixedness, immunity to functional fixedness, object affordance, cognitive development 
theories, insight problem solving, tool use, knowledge transfer in problem solving, and 
categorization.  Chapter III described the design of the research and the methods, 
including the materials used in the problem solving activity, and the procedure for 
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presenting the objects and the problem to the participants.  Chapter IV reported the data 
analysis of how many participants were able to solve the problem using the target object, 
how long the participants spent developing their solution, and whether there was any 
significant difference in the results, based on the experimental condition.  Finally, 
Chapter V will summarize the findings of the current study, provide a discussion of the 
results in comparison to the prior literature, followed by a conclusion and implications, 
and finishing with recommendations for further research. 
Summary of Finding 
 The analysis of the data relating to the first research question, are children 
impacted by functional fixedness when solving technological problems, indicated that 
children were in fact impacted by the condition in which the materials were presented to 
them.  When the target object was presented to the participants in the functional fixated 
condition, the children were significantly less likely to use the target object in their 
solution (3 out of 18 versus 14 out of 18; χ2 = 13.49, p<0.001).  Participants who used the 
target object in their solution took significantly less time to develop a solution to the 
problem (M = 90.21s vs. M = 260.48s; t(23.82) = 3.296, p = 0.003).  Therefore, given the 
effect of whether or not a participant used the target object on time-to-solution, a 
nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U-test, was used to determine if participants in the 
fixated group took significantly longer to develop their final solution to the problem.  
Based on the mean ranking of the Mann-Whitney U-test, participants in the fixated group 
took significantly longer (U = 84.00, p = 0.014) then participants in the nonfixated group.  
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 The analysis of the data relating to the second research question, was there a 
difference in effect of functional fixedness on participants based on their age, indicated 
there was no significant difference in performance as measured by target object use (χ2 = 
0.892, p = 0.640) and time-to-solution (F = 0.023, p = 0.977).  Finally, the analysis of the 
data relating to the third research question, would participation in an alternative 
categorization task prior to receiving the problem solving task improve the effects of 
functional fixedness on participants performance, indicated there was no significant 
difference in participants performance, as measured by target object use (χ2 = 0.400, p = 
0.527) and time-to-solution (t(16) = -0.235, p = 0.817). 
Discussion of Findings 
What does the literature tell us about why functional fixedness occurs or can be 
measured?  According to Bilalic, McLeod, and Gobet (2010), the Einstellung effect is a 
function of efficiency, if a solution has already been determined to be plausible then 
searching for a new solution would be an inefficient use of cognitive function.  Therefore, 
in the current study, participants in the functional fixated condition had already assigned 
a function to the box, through the process of placing all of the other items available to the 
participant inside the box.  Assigning the function of ‘container’ to the box appeared 
plausible, since they had stated earlier that the typical function of a box is a container and 
they were currently utilizing the box as a container.   Based on Bilalic, McLeod, and 
Gobet’s (2010) conclusion of the Einstellung effect, once the participants had determined 
that the appropriate function of the box was a container for holding the other objects, it 
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allowed the participants to ignore other possible uses for the box as part of the solution to 
the problem. 
Additionally, based on observing the participants’ approach to solving the 
particular problem presented in this study, in which the goal was to assist the character to 
retrieve an item from a high shelf, all of the participants focused on using a familiar 
strategy, the construction of a ladder / stair.   This singular focus of a familiar and 
plausible solution to retrieve an item that cannot be reached could be considered an 
additional example of the Einstellung effect. 
What does the literature tell us about why there was no significant difference in 
performance based on age?  Over the past few decades, there has been a tremendous 
growth in the understanding within developmental and cognitive psychology.  One of the 
immerging theories of cognitive development is that the basic neurological structures and 
core neurological functions of an adult are present at infancy (Murphy, 2002).  Therefore, 
cognitive development is a function of differences in experiences, domain knowledge, 
and processing capacity.  In other words, a child’s cognitive development occurs as a 
result of experiencing new interactions with the world, which leads to a greater 
understanding within a domain of knowledge, which intern leads to greater understanding 
across domains of knowledge. 
The concept of functional fixedness is based on two related theories of cognition, 
the first area of research is related to the functional affordance of an object and the 
second on the fixation on an idea, sometimes referred to as the Einstellung effect.  
Research on functional affordance has indicated that children as young as two-years-old 
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are able to determine the function of an object based on perceived similarities to known 
objects (Kemler Nelson, Russell, & Jones, 2000), based on observing others 
demonstration of the function of an object (Wohlegelernter, Diesendruck, and Markson, 
2010), and based on the child’s experimentation with the object (Kemler Nelson, Russell, 
Duke, and Jones, 2000).  Therefore, given the participants’ familiarity with the objects 
available to use in the problem solving activity, participants, no matter their age, 
effectively assigned the function of the target object (a box) as a container and therefore 
often ignored its existence when trying to solve the problem.  Some participants 
verbalized the need for their makeshift ladder to be taller and proceeded to search for 
additional objects inside the box, but never considered using the box as one of the items.  
Why then is there conflicting results between in the research conducted by 
German and Defeyter (2000), which concluded young children were immune to 
functional fixedness, and the current study which indicates young children are just as 
likely to experience functional fixedness?  First, it should be noted that in both studies, 
the sample size was relatively small and therefore the differences in participants could 
have been enough of a factor to change the results.   
However, it is important to consider the slight, but significant modification to the 
methodology.  In German and Defeyter’s study, the participants were presented with the 
objects either in a wooden box (pre-utilization condition) or with all of the objects placed 
next to the model (control condition).  In contrast, in the current study, the participants in 
both conditions received the objects one at a time and were asked to state the name of the 
object and its typical use.  Additionally, in the functional fixedness condition (pre-
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utilization) the participants utilized the typical function of the box (a container) by 
physically placing each item in the box.  The significance of this change required the 
participant to actively use the target object as a container, instead of observing how 
someone else has used the object. 
What does the literature tell us about overcoming fixation?  As described in 
Chapter II, there is some research evidence (e.g. Chrysikou, 2006; Flavel, Cooper, & 
Loiselle, 1958) that indicates it is possible to reduce the effect of fixation within problem 
solving through divergent thinking exercises.  In the current study, participants were 
presented with an alternative categorization task, similar to the one developed by 
Chrysikou (2006), in which the participants were asked to verbally list alternative uses 
for common items, such as a shoe, paper plate, ball, hat, etc., prior to receiving the 
problem solving task.  However, unlike Chrysikou’s (2006) research, the current study 
did not demonstrate measurable improvement in participants’ performance.   
One possible explanation for why there is some discrepancy between the results 
of Chrysikou (2006) and the current study is that although the alternative categorization 
tasks were similar, the problem solving tasks were significantly different.  In the 
Chrysikou (2006) study, participants both generated their alternative categorization task 
on paper and wrote out their solution to the various insight problem-solving tasks.  In 
other words, the way in which the participants conducted the alternative categorization 
task and the way in which they conducted the problem-solving task were closely 
associated with each other.  Whereas in the current study, the participants generated their 
ideas for the alternative categorization task verbally and then physically manipulated 
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objects to generate a solution to the problem-solving task.  In this case, the two activities 
had little in common and therefore the participants may not have associated the divergent 
thinking activity with the problem-solving task. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, the current study demonstrated children are susceptible to the effects 
of functional fixedness in problem solving, when the participant pre-utilized the target 
object in its typical function, resulting in children ignoring the availability of the object, 
which would allow them to solve the problem.  Second, the current study found no 
significant difference in the effect of functional fixedness on children across the three age 
groups (preschool, second grade, and ninth grade), which indicates given the right 
circumstances anyone can be susceptible to functional fixedness, resulting in impaired 
problem solving ability.  Finally, although there is some research evidence to suggest 
functional fixedness can be overcome with divergent thinking, the current study was 
unable to demonstrate improved performance based on an alternative categorization task. 
Based on the finding of this study the conclusions are as follows… 
• Children, as young as preschool (four & five-years-old), demonstrate effects 
of functional fixedness in problem solving, when the object is pre-utilized in 
its typical function. 
• There appears to be no significant difference in the effects of functional 
fixedness across three age groups (preschoolers, second graders, and ninth 
graders). 
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• The performance of an alternative categorization task prior to problem solving 
did not reduce the effects of functional fixedness. 
Implications and Recommendations 
 The current research, which demonstrated that participants will ignore the most 
viable solution to a problem, when they have become fixated on the pre-utilization 
function of the object, is concerning for the fields of engineering and technology, which 
are based on an individual’s ability to develop solutions to problems.  To illustrate the 
need for engineers to overcome the effects of functional fixedness, one can look at the 
challenges the engineers and crew had to overcome during the Apollo 13 mission, made 
famous by the movie of the same name.  During the launch of Apollo 13, the number two 
oxygen tank in the service module exploded.  As a result, the crew was forced to move to 
the lunar module, which was not designed to handle the carbon dioxide of three crew 
members for the length of time needed.  Therefore, the engineers and crew had to 
develop a solution to the problem of how to attach the command module’s lithium 
hydroxide canisters to the lunar module air filtration system using only the materials they 
had in the two crafts (cardboard, plastic bags, and tape) (NASA, 2009).  Had the 
engineers not been able to overcome the effects of functional fixation and use the items in 
an atypical way, the crew would not have survived the carbon dioxide buildup. 
 As illustrated by the Apollo 13 mission, the ability to overcome functional 
fixedness can be critical to problem solving.  The current study demonstrated that even 
young children are susceptible to functional fixedness and therefore, it is recommended 
that the issue should be studied further.   
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Given the small number of participants in the study, it is recommended that the 
current methodology be used in a larger sampling of children to determine if the findings 
remain consistent with a larger population.  In addition to a greater number of 
participants, future research should also include children from the complete range of 
student population, from preschool to grade twelve. 
A third recommendation would be to include a greater variety of problem-solving 
tasks.  With the research indicating a connection between prior experience and cognitive 
efficiency, the selection of problems should take into consideration the familiarity of the 
function of the target object to the participants.  For instance, a second problem that was 
developed by the researcher for a pilot study, involved using a pencil as the target object 
in the construction of a paper bridge.  The selection of the pencil was based on preschool 
children’s familiarity with using a pencil primarily as a writing or drawing utensil.  In 
examining the research originally conducted by German and Defeyter (2000), one 
hypothesis for their conclusions was that unlike older children, who primarily use a box 
as a container, whereas, younger children more freely use boxes in all sorts of 
imaginative ways, such as a house, spaceship, tunnel etc.  Therefore, if the familiarity of 
the target object’s function impacts functional fixedness, it was hypothesized that having 
preschool children use an object, which they too readily use with a predefined function, 
may have an impact on the effect of functional fixedness. 
A forth recommendation for future study, would be to conduct a mixed method 
analysis of the participants’ thought processes as they work through the problem-solving 
tasks.  As part of the current study, the participants were instructed to use a “think-aloud” 
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protocol, verbally expressing their thought process, while they worked on their problem 
solutions.  The participants were audio and video recorded, which will be used in a 
follow up study to analyze the thought process and strategies used by the participants to 
attempt to solve the problem.  Additionally, it is recommended that the participants be 
interviewed after they had declared they have finished solving the problem in order to 
achieve a greater insight into their thought process.  An interview could be especially 
interesting in the case of the participants who did not use the target object.  A mixed 
method study may be able to provide additional insight into why the participants in the 
fixated condition ignored the seemingly most obvious solution to the problem.  
Given the lack of measurable improvement to the effects of functional fixedness 
by participants who participated in an alternative categorization task, a fifth 
recommendation is to develop and analyze different strategies for overcoming functional 
fixedness.  According to the research conducted by Chrysikou (2006), the Einstellung 
effect can be overcome by using a divergent thinking exercise.  One possible idea would 
be to have the strategy more closely align with the type of object manipulation the 
participants are asked to do during the problem-solving task, such as using a box for 
functions other than a container.   
Finally, it is recommended to develop and analyze strategies that will take the 
results of the research on functional fixedness and implement solutions into the school 
curriculum.  Given the results of the current study, children are susceptible to functional 
fixedness and therefore, one of the strategies that classroom teachers should evaluate is 
the effectiveness of explicitly pointing out the child’s fixation during problem solving as 
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part of the teachers regular formative assessment of students’ problem solving.  Using 
this strategy, the teacher would make the students’ fixation conscious to them thereby 
allowing the students to evaluate and adjust their strategy.  For example, given the 
problem in this study, the teacher could ask the student if they had thought about using 
the box as part of their solution. 
A second strategy a teacher could use would be to teach the students to use 
divergent thinking strategies.  For example, the teacher could have the students practice 
developing solutions to a problem where the obvious material needed to solve the 
problem is missing, similar to the problem the engineers, who worked on the Apollo 13 
mission, faced.  A second example would be to have students practice using objects in 
atypical ways. 
Finally, given the research that indicates fixation in problem solving is a function 
of cognitive efficiency (Bilalic, McLeod, & Gobet, 2010), teachers could teach student 
more methodical methods for approaching a problem, thereby increasing their solution 
efficiency and reducing the need for fixation. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Total Time to Solution: Fixated Condition 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
57.10 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
59.90 1 5.6 5.6 11.1 
61.40 1 5.6 5.6 16.7 
92.30 1 5.6 5.6 22.2 
100.70 1 5.6 5.6 27.8 
107.50 1 5.6 5.6 33.3 
132.30 1 5.6 5.6 38.9 
135.00 1 5.6 5.6 44.4 
175.30 1 5.6 5.6 50.0 
182.40 1 5.6 5.6 55.6 
183.80 1 5.6 5.6 61.1 
202.80 1 5.6 5.6 66.7 
215.70 1 5.6 5.6 72.2 
219.70 1 5.6 5.6 77.8 
309.00 1 5.6 5.6 83.3 
488.80 1 5.6 5.6 88.9 
523.00 1 5.6 5.6 94.4 
553.50 1 5.6 5.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 18 100.0 100.0  
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Table A2: Total Time to Solution: Nonfixated Condition 
TotalTime_to_Solution 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
16.70 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
16.90 1 5.6 5.6 11.1 
32.90 1 5.6 5.6 16.7 
46.50 1 5.6 5.6 22.2 
50.50 1 5.6 5.6 27.8 
50.90 1 5.6 5.6 33.3 
53.30 1 5.6 5.6 38.9 
54.00 1 5.6 5.6 44.4 
68.40 1 5.6 5.6 50.0 
70.60 1 5.6 5.6 55.6 
90.00 1 5.6 5.6 61.1 
103.30 1 5.6 5.6 66.7 
114.00 1 5.6 5.6 72.2 
134.10 1 5.6 5.6 77.8 
181.10 1 5.6 5.6 83.3 
333.00 1 5.6 5.6 88.9 
446.80 1 5.6 5.6 94.4 
819.40 1 5.6 5.6 100.0 
Valid 
Total 18 100.0 100.0  
 
